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On November 1, 1984, Peter G. Fish, Duke University Professor of Political Science 
and Law, attended the annual meeting of the Southern Political Science Association in 
Savannah, Georgia, where he presented a paper entitled ']udgejohnJ Parker of the 
United States Court of Appeals:judicial Apostle of New South Progressivism, 1925-30." 
The following material is excerpted from that paper. 
TO THE SUPREME COURT 
Before a gathering of the White House press corps 
at a four o 'clock news conference on Friday, March 21 , 
1930, President Herbert Hoover announced his nomina-
tion of John]. Parker, Judge of the Court of Appeals for 
the Fourth Circuit, for AssociateJustice of the United 
States Supreme Court. Although utterly lacking in 
national visibility, the 44 year-old North Carolinian 
brought impressive credentials: a distinguished under-
graduate academic career at the University of North 
Carolina from 1903-07, a year of legal education there, a 
flourishing general law practice largely in his home-
town of Monroe and then in the bustling commercial 
center of Charlotte, and Supreme Court litigation 
experience as counsel for country banks in their battle 
with the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond. Above all, 
he possessed close ties to the "business respectable" 
faction of the state Republican party His contributions 
to it as a member ofJohn Motley Morehead's dominant 
bloc included vigorous but fruitless campaigns as G.O.P 
candidate for Congress in 1910, attorney general in 
1916, and governor in 1920. Following Morehead's 
death in December, 1923, Parker became national com-
mitteeman. His yeoman services to the party combined 
with advocacy skills attained as a courtroom lawyer led 
to appointment as Special Assistant to the Attorney Gen-
eral of the United States in 1923-24 during which time 
he unsuccessfully prosecuted alleged war profiteers. At 
the unusually young age of 40, he had been appointed 
to the three-member regional appellate bench by 
Hoover's predecessor, Calvin Coolidge, on October 
3,1925. 
[Judge Parker quickly assumed a leadership role on 
the Court of Appeals, leading his proponents to praise 
the nomination of this "apt representative of the 'New 
South:" His critics, however, denounced him as "unciv-
ilized;' a racist, a "sworn enemy oflabor" and repre-
sentative of big business interests, and an extreme 
conservative. These diametrically opposed views of 
Peter Fish 
Parker's fitness for the High Court bench led to pro-
longed debate in the Senate over his nomination.] 
In the six-week battle over Parker's confirmation, his 
record as a jurist on the United States Court of Appeals 
compiled over approximately four years received little 
consideration. Only his single decision affirming a lower 
court injunction against the United Mine Worker's 
unionization campaign in the southern bituminous coal-
fields drew attention. For black antagoniSts, his previous 
political record, not his subsequent judicial perfor-
mance, disqualified him. These antagonists prevailed 
on May 7,1930, when the Senate, on a 41-39 vote 
refused to advise and consent to President Hoover's 
second Supreme Court nomination. 
Hindsight would suggest that the Senate had erred. 
But vision improved only after it became apparent that 
the judicial record of substitute nominee Owen Jose-
ph us Roberts would fall well short of meeting hopes 
DUKE LAW MAGAZINE /38 
held for him by Parker's opponents. But, in fact, the 
North Carolinian's record made reasonably clear at the 
moment of nomination both his judicial philosophy 
and its antecedents. 
THE PUBLIC SERVICE STATE 
A. Institutional reform impulses 
However much preference might be accorded the 
value of private property, realization of the New South 
demanded active modern government, government free 
of the debilitating influence of populism yet capable of 
modifying tendencies toward economic laissezjairism. 
Parker stood on the platform of progressivism in advo-
cating efficacious means for attaining a prosperous and 
free society In his 1920 gubernatorial race, he identi-
fied himself as "a progressive;' while berating Demo-
cratic opponent Cameron Morrison as "a hopeless 
standpatter." Manifestations of progressivism surfaced 
in proposals for imposing on government institutions 
Frederick W Taylor's business-based prescriptions for 
efficiency, centralization, coordination, rationalization, 
and integration. Inefficient state government could be 
traced to a fragmented organization which, in turn, gave 
rise to political irresponsibility 
The solution, as Parker saw it, lay in a strong and 
unified executive department. Paramount was establish-
ment of an executive budget system analogous to that 
soon to be adopted by the federal government in the 
Budget and Accounting Act of 1921. Imperative too was 
a shift in the source of state revenues from real property 
taxes "paid by the small farmer, the home owner, and 
the tenant;' to a progressive income tax "which will 
recognize that we are no longer a purely agricultural 
state, but have become a manufacturing and commer-
cial state as weIr' Modern state government required an 
executive veto and a council of state appointed by the 
governor in lieu of the existing one whose members 
were separately elected. 
Once on the bench, Parker's reformist impulses 
became muted, although they grew pronounced in the 
1930's when he achieved national fame as· an advocate 
of administrative and procedural reforms in federal and 
state court systems. Glimpses of his affinity for efficient, 
simple and judge-controlled case processing surfaced 
in appeals presenting esoteric procedural technicalities. 
On the bench, Parker's refonnist impulses 
became muted 
When counsel for the Great American Insurance Com-
pany complacently introduced no testimony and 
serenely awaited a favorable judgment on grounds that 
the insured had erroneously sought a remedy at law 
rather than one in equity, Parker fairly bristled. Hailing 
from a code pleading state where distinctions between 
law and equity had been abolished, he demanded to 
know whether appellant's counsel anticipated a favor-
able outcome "merely because the case was heard on 
the law side . .. "? Such a holding would, he warned, 
"hark back to the outworn technicalities of a day that is 
dead . . .. " 1 Worse still, it would prove conducive to inef-
ficient administration and consequently to burdensome 
costs imposed on the plaintiff-insured. Nothing required 
him to find prejudicial error and order a new trial 
"where all of the evidence in the lower court is before 
us, where it appears that the case was fully developed, 
and where the relief obtained at law is exactly what ... 
should have been awarded in equity .. .. " 
Reliance on technicalities associated with criminal 
procedure likewise received a chilly reception. He 
applied the due process "fair trial" standard in gauging 
criminal procedures. But it was enough that indict-
ments contained sufficient information "to fairly and 
reasonably inform the defendants of the character of 
tile offense charged ... :'2 Mere failure of indictment lan-
guage "to allege that the automobile was in fact stolen 
when it is alleged that the defendants on receiving it 
knew it to have been stolen can be nothing more than a 
defect of form which could not possibly tend to their 
prejudice . . . ;' he remarked in Wendell v. United States.3 
No explanation of a preference for substance over form 
in criminal cases appeared in his published opinions. 
But privately, he exclaimed that "it would be a reproach 
to the administration of justice to allow defendants to 
escape conviction on such a technicality" 
B. Unshackling reserved "police powers" 
The public service state envisioned by Parker clearly 
emerged in numerous 1920 campaign addresses. In 
common with other Soutllern progressives, his pro-
gram for affirmative state activity contained a noticeable 
rural tilt, intended to meet a perennial agricultural 
problem distinguished by a "exodus of the farm popu-
lation from the countrySide." Preservation of rural and 
small-town Carolina, together with that society's vital 
moral values demanded expanded governmental ser-
vices and transfer of their administration from the 
counties to Raleigh. Farmers would directly benefit 
from centralized state-sponsored cooperative market-
ing and from what he called "a liberal system of rural 
credits." 
The paucity of two hallmarks of twentieth century 
civilization constituted a major impetus for the rural 
exodus, Parker believed. In advocating good roads and 
good schools, he reportedly "went as far, if not fartller, 
than any other candidate." The motoring buff and 
member of the state's Good Roads Association decried 
North Carolina's highway construction efforts and called 
for a program financed by borrowing, the interest and 
principal to be met by automobile and gasoline taxes. 
North Carolina schools were as poor as its roads, espe-
cialy in rural districts. "We must create a state system of 
public schools;' he urged, "a system in which the state 
collects the school money and distributes it so as to give 
the children in every county an equal opportunity for 
education: ' Higher teachers' salaries, free books, voca-
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tional education, and even improved mental health 
facilities all became possible with a unified and efficient 
government pursuing priorities vital to a modern state. 
No predisposition to second-guess or to nullify gov-
ernmental acts marked Parker's jurisprudence from 
1925 to early 1930. On the contrary, his decisions sug-
gest a solicitude for often hard-pressed state and munic-
ipal governments sometimes impaled on unforeseen 
consequences of their modernization efforts. Even in 
mundane contract actions, a recognition of an interrela-
tionship between law and politics surfaced. The novice 
His decisions suggest a solicitude for 
often hard-pressed state and municipal 
governments. 
jurist reacted heatedly when a breaching contractor 
sued Marion County, West Virginia, for payments due, 
allowed the case to languish on the docket for four 
years, suddenly brought it to trial in the midst of confu-
sion caused by a transfer of county political control, and 
won by default.4 Privately he castigated the plaintiffs for 
securing a court-ordered award "by means of conduct 
which renders it unconscionable that the judgment be 
allowed to stand ... . " It would fall even if only private 
parties were involved. "But certainly," he continued, 
"where defendant is a county and where it appears . . .. 
Ulat there had been a complete change of the county 
officials, this court ought not allow a judgment to stand 
unless it appears that the county was fairly notified that 
me case was set for trial." 
Political turmoil Similarly gripped a North Carolina 
county government which had contracted for construc-
tion of an inaccessible highway bridge. An anti-bridge 
faction subsequently gained control of the Board of 
Commissioners and cancelled the contract, whereupon 
me contractor blithely completed the project. His suit 
for payment received a favorable answer from three 
dissident members of the Board, none of whom had sat 
for ten months and one of whom had actually resigned. 
Yet, acting in the Board's name, they admitted fulilia-
bility. Parker reversed.5 The contractor, he said in his 
case memorandum, "had no right to increase tl1e dam-
ages by proceeding with the erection of the bridge in 
me midst of tl1e wilderness, which is perfectly useless 
to the county or to anybody else." 
Business regulations under reserved state police 
powers were deemed by Parker as conducive to eco-
nomic progress, not as threats to economic enterprise. 
An order by the City fathers of Lincolnton, North Caro-
lina, directing a railroad to replace wooden bridges, 
formerly specified by ordinance, with more fire resis-
tant concrete structures met with his approval.6 The 
railroad's fusillade of objections founded on the Con-
stitution's obligation of contract and commerce clauses 
as well as on the fourteenth anlendment left him 
unmoved. Perhaps more impressed with the relation-
ship of the new bridge ordinance to the "City Beautiful" 
movement than to fire safety conSiderations, Parker 
reflected on the march of municipal progress occurring 
since enactment of the wooden bridge ordinance in 
1901. From that date, he mused in his case memoran-
dum, "the town ofLincolnton has grown to be much 
larger than formerly, the business section has spread 
out beyond the bridges, streets have been paved with 
concrete, and the old bridges constitute a fire menace 
and are altogether unsightly and out of keeping with 
the streets and other improvements within the town .. .. " 
Lincolnton was not unique. "Progress and development" 
had visited other municipalities since the turn of the 
century and required "many things . . . for the public 
safety which were not necessary then." After all, "the 
main street of the City is paved with concrete and asphalt, 
and a steel or wooden bridge would be absolutely out 
of keeping with the remainder of the street. .. . " With 
such aesthetic considerations looming so large in the 
mind of the "Good Roads" booster, Parker proclaimed 
privately that "it is nothing but right and proper, in my 
judgment, that the railroad company should be required 
to construct a viaduct in keeping with the remainder of 
tl1e street." 
His published opinion in the Lincolnton Case mani-
fested virtual disappearance of "City Beautiful" allu-
sions. Parker quietly dismissed tl1e commerce clause 
argument as "so frivolous as not to merit discussion; ' 
while he quashed the often potent substantive due pro-
cess argument. 
No facts are alleged upon which the conclusion can 
legitimately be based that the extension of the fire limits 
was not justified by the growth and development of the 
town, or that the replacing of wooden by concrete 
bridges was not required for the safety of the public, or 
that the building of concrete bridges would entail any 
undue hardship or unreasonable expense .. . ? 
He acted ... ((with the feeling that we 
ought not interfere with the stateJs 
collection of its tax if it is possible to 
avoid doing so.)) 
The obligation of contract issue likewise received 
short shrift from Parker who believed that the railroad 
enjoyed at most a muniCipally-granted license, not a 
vested right in its property But his formal opinion 
focused on subordination of such rights to the state 
police powers. Certainly, Lincolnton had never "intended 
to surrender for an indefinite future the right to provide 
for the safety of the public using its streets, or the right 
to control, in the interest of fire prevention, the struc-
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tures to be erected in or near the center of its business 
section ... . And, if the town had attempted by contract 
to part with such rights, the contract would have been 
void, because contrary to public policy." 
Two years before, Parker had Similarly eschewed 
foisting a contract clause restraint on Lynchburg, Vir-
ginia, which in 1908 had granted the Lynchburg Trac-
tion and Light Company a trolley franchise. Its terms 
stipulated a five-cent fare within city limits. Beyond 
those limits, a six-cent fare had been authorized by the 
Virginia Corporation Commission. The two decades 
since issuance of the franchise brought growth to Lynch-
burg and its annexation of unincorporated areas in the 
six-cent fare district. When in 1925 the city ordered a 
fare reduction to five cents within the annexed areas, 
the Company sought an injunction on grounds that the 
City had violated an obligation of contract.s Parker, how-
ever, could find no contract beween the city and trolley 
company mandating a six-cent fare. That higher fare had 
been granted by the state agency under its police 
powers, not by the city: 
Parker also exercised self-restraint in other state 
regulatory cases, concurring in a decision upholding 
the power of Virginia's Commissioner of Fisheries to 
exclude oyster harvesters from navigable waters of the 
state allocated to oyster raisers.9 Similar restraint marked 
his treatment of Virginia's efforts to combat cedar rust, a 
fungus disease in which the fungus winters on cedar 
tree hosts before disseminating spores that subse-
quently infect apple tree hosts. Thereafter the cedars 
are reinfected and the cycle continues. Prior to develop-
ment of antibiotics, the sole method of controlling the 
disease required elimination of one of the two varieties 
of host trees. To protect its economically valuable apple 
crop, Virginia enacted the "Cedar Rust" law establishing 
procedures for destruction of cedar tree hosts. Enforce-
ment of the law by the state entomologist threatened 
Kelleher, owner of a 2,200 acre Shenandoah Valley 
estate, with loss of cedar trees which shaded his cattle 
and beautified his mansion. He sought to enjOin 
execution of the Commonwealth's regulatory statute 
by raising questions of constitutional and statutory 
interpretation. 
To Kelleher's argument that Virginia's law had taken 
his property without due process of law contrary to the 
fourteenth amendment, Parker responded, 
[W)e have no doubt that the enactment of the statute was 
a valid exercise of the police power of the state . . . . [I)t 
does not authorize the taking of one man's property for 
another man's benefit, but it is a reasonable regulation of 
the use of property in furtherance of the public welfare. 
It authorizes the destruction of trees, which are shown 
to be of but comparatively little value, only where they 
constitute a menace to a great industry of the state. I a 
To be sure, gentleman farmer Kelleher enjoyed a prop-
erty right in his attractive cedar trees, but the due pro-
cess clause did not bar Virginia from saying "that in the 
enjoyment of property the owner shall not use it in 
such a way as to endanger the rights and property of 
others." 
Having disposed of the substantive due process 
issue, Parker turned to the more difficult task of con-
struing the statute. Sections one and two of the Cedar 
Rust Act of 1914 were shrouded in a degree of ambi-
guity sufficient to permit federal court nullification by 
statutory construction. Section one declared cedar trees 
within one mile of an apple orchard a public nuisance 
per se and authorized the state entomologist to order 
their destruction. Section two authorized him to investi-
gate "host" cedar trees upon the request of ten free-
holders and, if deemed a threat to apple trees within a 
two-mile radius, order their destruction. Kelleher's 
cedars lay within two miles but not within one of an 
apple orchard. He contended that the two-mile radius 
in the 1914 Act was a clerical error which if corrected 
would read "one mile:' Not so, replied Parker: 
For us to assume that the Virginia legislature intended to 
change the radius of the second section also, would be 
to indulge in a mere guess unsupported by the language 
or the history of the act, and completely at variance with 
the plain meaning of the language used.II 
Eminently "more reasonable;' he thought, "as well as 
more respectful to the lawmaking body of the state, 
[was 1 to assume that, if it had intended to amend the 
second section at the time it amended the first section it 
would have done so:' 
Caution characterized Parker's response 
to public utilities regulation. 
Three-judge court colleague Henry Clay McDowell 
of Virginia's Western District maintained that the 1920 
amendment had left in force a one-mile radius rule in 
those counties adopting the 1914 Act, a condition prece-
dent to the law's effective operation. That the amending 
legislation of 1920 had established a two-mile radius, 
thereby destroying Kelleher's vested right "to possess 
and enjoy cedar trees more than one mile and within 
two miles of an orchard ... " rendered it suspect. And, 
the failure to mention the local option provision meant 
to him that the one-mile radius had not been sus-
pended by the 1920 Act and remained the law of those 
counties which had adopted it between 1914 and 1920, 
unless, of course, they consented to the amendment. 
McDowell would dissent on this basis. To his argument 
Parker remonstrated: 
When the Legislature amended the statute, it changed 
that [1914) law. It did not leave the old law in existence 
unaffected by the amendment, as it might have done, 
and pass a new law for such counties and districts as 
might thereafter adopt it. It amended the only law which 
was in existence on the subject; and as that had become 
by adoption the law of certain districts , it thereby 
amended the law of those districts. I 2 
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That it had made the 1914 Act operative only on county 
consent did not impair its law-making power to amend 
that law at a later time without such local approval. 
How could it be otherwise, he asked McDowell? 
Must the court hold that because a legislature in grant-
ing a City charter subject to adoption by referendum or 
vote by governmental bodies could amend that charter 
not by general legislation but only by a similar consen-
sual mode of amendment? Such a restrictive view of 
legislative power would, he warned McDowell, "lead to 
endless difficulty for the courts .... " Furthermore, to 
maintain, as did the district judge, that the Act of 1914 
remained in its unamended pristine form in those 
counties which had adopted it "would be judicial legis-
lation and judicial legislation of the most indefensible 
sort; for we would be holding the unamended statute to 
be effective after it had been expressly amended by the 
Legislature." More cautious phraseology on the same 
point marked his opinion in the published case. But 
obViously his caution extended beyond form; it per-
vaded the substance of his judicial philosophy. States 
and their sub-divisions were not to be shackled by fed-
eral judges except in the clearest of cases. 
The property rights of the Suncrest Lumber Com-
pany were, like those of estate owner Kelleher, also 
subordinated to state police powers, in this instance to 
that of condemnation. 13 The Delaware corporation 
owned vast stands of valuable virgin spruce, hemlock, 
chestnut, and yellow popular timber in western North 
Carolina. At least 26,000 acres of its holdings fell within 
the boundaries of the projected Great Smoky Moun-
tains National Park. Since the mid-1920's, North Carolin-
ians had been promoting a park in that area to serve 
multiple purposes: recreation, tourism, forest, and water 
preservation. But unlike parks developed on the public 
domains in the West, eastern parks such as that in the 
Great Smokies had to be carved out of the private 
domain. To this end Congress in 1926 authorized cre-
ation of d1e Park and empowered the United States Gov-
ernment to accept at zero cost park lands in fee simple. 
Aided by a $2,000,000 bond issue and by millions more 
donated by]ohn D. Rockefeller,]r., the North Carolina 
Park Commission moved to condemn and purchase its 
225,000 acre share of the new Park. Lumber companies 
responded by accelerating their timber cutting opera-
tions. To prevent denuding of lands within the pro-
jected Park's boundaries, the Commission enjoined 
timber cutting pending condemnation proceedings, at 
which point the Suncrest Lumber Company sought a 
federal injunction against further state interference with 
use of their mou ntain properties. 
Before a three-judge district court, which included 
Parker, me Commission fought and won its first serious 
legal battle. Answering the plaintiffs argument that 
North Carolina could not empower a state judge to 
enjoin its frantic timber cutting without violating the 
due process clause of the fourteenth Amendment, 
Parker declared in Suncrest Lumber Co. v. North Caro-
lina Park Commission: 
It would seem self-evident that, if the State has a right to 
take property for a public use, it has the right while 
engaged in the act of taking to prevent it from being so 
mutilated as to destroy the use which it has for the 
public. 14 
This power was especially necessary where, as in the 
case at hand, the extent of the condemned lands were 
large, the surveying process slow, and the administrative 
and adjudicatory processes time-consuming. That the 
Commission should be subjected to a temporary 
Fourteenth amendment substantive due 
process jurisprudence hardly affected 
Parker's decisions. 
restraining order appalled Parker. Such a course, he 
objected, would delay: 
acquiSition of lands for the Great Smoky Mountains Park, 
a great public enterprise which should be of inestimable 
value to that section of the country as a help toward 
flood control and as proViding a beautiful recreation 
park for the benefit of the people. 
Restraining d1e Commission would emphatically not 
serve the purpose of equity; it would not preserve the 
status quo. Instead, such judicial intervention "would 
result in depreciating the value of the property for the 
purpose of which it is desired by the public." 
Suncrest Lumber immediately carried Parker's deci-
sion to the United States Supreme Court, arguing their 
case for a restraining order pending appeal before 
Chiefjustice Taft, Circuit]ustice for the Fourth Circuit. 
With the lower court's decree and opinion in hand, 
Lycurgus R. Varser, attorney for North Carolina, felt con-
fident that Parker's "admirable opinion [would be] 
ample to convince . .. him that the restraining order ... 
ought not to be issued." The hearing in fact went well 
for the State. "The Chiefjustice complimented your 
opinion-proper,y," the Lumberton lawyer and name-
sake of the Nintl1 Century B.C. Spartan lawgiver reported 
to the Tar Heel jurist who had in his Suncrest opinion 
subordinated private property rights to the public inter-
est. The Taft Court agreed with his judgment and dis-
missed the company's appeal. IS 
C. Nurturing state taxing power 
State taxing power provides an essential support for 
the public service state. Parker looked benignly on its 
exercise. A graduated excise tax levied by South Caro-
lina on local retailers of tobacco products was effected 
by stamps affixed to the individual items which had 
been shipped in interstate commerce and which were 
ready either for transit out of state or for local sale even 
if remaining in their original package. Alleging the 
unconstitutionality of the tax, Charleston tobacco 
dealers sought to enjoin collection by South Carolina's 
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Tax Commission. Parker, in authoring the three-judge 
district court's opinion, did not write on a clean state. 
Early in the life of the Taft Court, a tangled mass of 
precedents on state taxing powers had been sorted out 
largely ... through the intra-Court lobbying efforts of 
Justice Brandeis. Brandeis stressed that the key test of 
constitutionality related to whether or not the state tax 
fell as a direct burden on goods in their original pack-
age but "at rest" following their interstate movement. 
Also considered was whether or not the tax was nondis-
criminatory as between goods shipped in intrastate and 
those shipped in interstate commerce. These Brandeis-
ian principles filtered into Justice Mahlon Pitney's 
opinion in Texas Co. v. Brown, 16 and into Chief Justice 
Taft's burial in Sonneborn Bros. v. Cureton, 17 of the 
"original package" doctrine applicable to goods which 
moved only in interstate commerce. 
In denying injunctive relief to the Charleston tobacco 
dealers, Parker relied on the pair of Taft Court opinions 
in Sonneborn Bros. and Texas Co. He observed in 
Dosher v. Query: 
[JJust as the commerce clause will not protect property 
from taxation after its interstate journey has ended and it 
has come to rest and become part of the general mass of 
property within the state, neither will that clause protect 
from taxation property that is still at rest and a part of 
such general mass of property, even though it be 
intended for export or shipment in interstate commerce, 
if the movement in foreign or interstate commerce be 
not actually commenced .. .. And this is true, notwith-
standing the goods have been transported in interstate 
commerce to the place where they are sought to be 
taxed, and are intended for shipment to other states, if 
they have reached the destination of their first journey 
and are being held by their owner for disposition in the 
ordinary course of business, and the stoppage be not a 
mere temporary delay in transportation.I 8 
Conceivably, the tax statute might be unconstitutional, 
but if so, it was because of a conflict with the constitu-
tion of South Carolina. And, that was pre-eminently a 
question to be answered in the first instance by the 
Palmetto State's Supreme Court. 
Less successful was Parker's attempt to free South 
Carolina's taxing power from injunctive shackles in 
Southern Railway Co. v. Query. 19 Claiming that state 
assessments had taxed income derived from interstate 
commerce and therefore had unconstitutionally bur-
dened such commerce, the railroad sought and won, 
much to Parker's chagrin, an injunction against collec-
tion of the disputed taxes. On first impression, he 
doubted any need for imposing equitable restraints on 
South Carolina because, as he informed one of the resi-
dent trial judges on the three-judge district court, "the 
remedy at law is plain, adequate and complete: ' After 
all, the statute which created the state's Tax Commission 
had provided that by paying under protest, the taxpayer 
could sue the Commission for recovery of taxes paid, 
and the Supreme Court of South Carolina had held that 
such recovery could include interest as well as principal, 
a holding which the Fourth Circuit judge gratuitously 
pronounced as "in accordance with natural justice." 
Colleague Ernest E Cochran of the Eastern District of 
South Carolina, author of tl1e published opinion, took a 
very different view. 
Cochran maintained that in fact the aggrieved tax-
payer enjoyed access only to an equitable remedy in 
federal court. Contrary to Parker's contention, the dis-
trict judge invoked Smith v. Reeves,20 a decision of the 
United States Supreme Court which had held that an 
action at law to recover tax overpayments was a suit 
against the state tax commission. It was therefore a judg-
ment to be paid directly out of the state treasury and 
constituted a suit against the state barred by the elev-
entl1 amendment-unless the State had consented to 
be sued. South Carolina had explicitly consented to be 
sued, but only in its Court of Common Pleas. A per-
plexed Cochran laid out the legal dilemma in a long 
letter to Parker. He explained: 
If we say that the suit is not one against the State, then we 
are deciding directly contrary to Smith v. Reeves. If we 
say that the State has no right to restrict it to the Common 
Pleas and that therefore a party may sue in the Federal 
Court, we are directly in conflict with those decisions 
which say that the State has such a right. If we say that 
[the statutory consent to suit) in Common Pleas, intended 
that it might also be brought in another court, then it 
seems to me we do violence to the English language; for 
it certainly was the intention of the framers of the Act to 
restrict the suit to the Common Pleas. If we say that the 
suit provided for, while it must be brought in the Com-
mon Pleas and cannot be brought in the Federal Court, 
is adequate, then we are in conflict with those decisions 
which establish with equal firmness the principle that 
the suit must be available in the Federal Court. 
Cochran concluded "tl1at the only way to give effect to 
these established principles is to hold that in this case 
the State has consented to be sued in the Common 
Pleas; that such remedy is not available in tl1e Federal 
Court, and therefore the remedy at law is inadequate, 
and the interlocutory injunction should issue." 
A dismayed Parker admitted the correctness of 
Cochran's assessment. 'At least, I am not able logically 
He believed that unleashing of the 
individual's energies offered a sure route 
to realization of the good society. 
to combat the conclUSion;' he wrote. "Nevertheless, I 
have a feeling that it is wrong, without being able to 
give any very good reason for the feeling:' And, reiterat-
ing his Senior CircuitJudge, Edmund Waddill, Jr., the 
Tar Heel jurist guessed he would "have to go along with 
you, unless I can discover some good ground for hold-
ing the contrary" When further research failed to yield 
an alternative course of jurisprudence, Parker con-
curred in Cochran's opinion enjoining the tax com-
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mission. He acted reluctantly and "with the feeling that 
we ought not interfere with the state's collection of its 
tax if it is possible to avoid doing so .... " 
With the authorities against him, he felt confident 
that Cochran's "fine piece of work will put the matter 
squarely up to the Supreme Court, and if that Court 
thinks that an injunction should not be granted in such 
cases as this, it will have to modify some of its previous 
decisions." 
Broad construction of national 
commerce power ... marked his record 
D. Restraining State Power 
Not all state regulatory actions received Fourth Cir-
cuit approval. Caution characterized Parker's response 
to public utilities regulation. Railroads and electric 
power companies provided vital elements of the region's 
economic infrastructure. They were themselves harbin-
gers of progress; their franchises were "valuable not 
only to the [utility 1 but to the community which it 
serves."21 Mullins, South Carolina, therefore could not 
acquire by prescription a portion of the Atlantic Coast 
Line's right of way. Nor could tlle South Carolina Rail-
road Commission require the Southern Railway to 
~witch cars from a tiny local feeder line onto the regional 
carrier's tracks. 22 The state agency's order conflicted 
with national commerce power and took "property 
without due process of law . .. because [it 1 required the 
Southern Railway, without compensation, to open up 
terminal facilities to competitors." 
Fourteenth amendment substantive due process 
jurisprudence hardly affected Parker's decisions, how-
ever much it marked tllose of the Supreme Court dur-
ing Taft's chief justiceship. That public power-limiting 
doctrine did figure in the unpublished three-judge dis-
trict court opinion delivered by Parker in Bluefield 
Water Works Improvement Co. v. Public Service Com-
mission. 23 The Supreme Court had previously over-
turned both the Commission and West Virginia's high 
court in a case involving the same parties. Associate 
Justice Pierce Butler, writing for the Court, held that 
reproduction cost, not the original cost of the Com-
pany's water works, was the proper rate base. That the 
agency had "wholly disregarded" the former base not-
withstanding the post-war inflationary surge in con-
struction costs led him to ... conclude "that a rate of 
return of 6 percent upon the value of the property is 
substantially too low to constitute just compensation for 
ule use of the property. . .. " The unmistakable tenor of 
Butler's message in the Bluefield Water Works litigation 
doubtlessly encouraged close scrutiny of the Commis-
sion's subsequent findings. These, Parker deemed in 
error. They underrated interest paid by the utility on 
new construction as well as the Company's "going 
value;' and the seven and one-half percent on capital he 
deemed inadequate. 
"Taking all these things into consideration;' the cir-
cuit judge opined "that the complainants have made a 
showing, probably, for, and that they are entitled to, the 
preliminary injunction [for 1 which they pray." But he 
granted the injunction with strings attached. The Com-
mission was restrained from enforcing its order or from 
interfering with the plaintiffs in putting into effect the 
schedule of rates in accordance with this order. ... " The 
temporary injunction also limited the Company from 
fixing rates which exceeded by more than ten percent 
those previously approved by the Commission, and 
required that strict accounting be made of the rate 
increase, and that a $25,000 bond be posted from which 
refunds to ratepayers might be distributed should facts 
found on a final hearing warrant. The Court subse-
quently dismissed the suit following agreement by the 
Commission and the Company on "the fair value for 
rate making purposes ... of the plant and property," on 
"a fair return ... of eight ... percent," and on a new rate 
schedule. 
CONCLUSION 
Whatever Parker's public image molded in the 
weeks following nomination to the Supreme Court, his 
judicial record remains as clear today as it was from 
March to May 1930. No clairvoyance is required now, 
nor was it needed then to classify Parker's jurispru-
dence articulated as a member of the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit from late 1925 
to March 1930. Combined with the public record made 
as a politiCian, attorney, and civic leader prior to ascend-
ing the appellate bench, his status as a New South pro-
greSSive is evident. He articulated typical tllemes of 
progressivism in his speeches, decrying turmoil and 
moral erosion and questing for order and oppportunity 
in society. Uplifting of citizens to new heights required 
social regulation-control of liquor, suffrage for 
women, disfranchisement of blacks. Yet in speaking 
to these impassioned issues of public policy as a jurist, 
Parker treated them not as a zealot, but with the caution 
Reliance on technicalities associated 
with criminal procedure ... received a 
chilly reception. 
and study befitting a federal judge. 
In common with progressives generally, he sought 
no radical transformation of society. The linchpin of 
society was the individual and, in the tradition of tlle 
previous century, he believed that unleashing of the 
individual 's energies offered a sure route to realization 
of the good society. Essential to that end was protection 
of private property, especially that created byenter-
prising individuals. This theme coursed most promi-
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nently through his opinions relating to patents, federal 
taxation of business corporations, and in his single 
Sherman Anti-Trust Act case between private business-
firm litigants. 
Tempering an affinity for property rights was a 
recognition of the necessity for the "public service" 
state as an instrument for promoting New South eco-
nomic growth. Parker's embrace of "business progres-
sivism" became manifest in this context. An enthusiasm 
for reform of governmental structure surfaced in judi-
cial opinions giving short shrift to archaic and complex 
legal procedures. No "judiCial legislator," his Cedar Rust 
and Suncrest Lumber opinions made clear a concern 
for unshackling the reserved police powers of the sev-
eral states and, in his vindication of state taxing power, 
the ability to raise revenues necessary for development 
of public services. Restraints on state powers might be 
required, especially by the imperatives of the Taft Court's 
jurisprudence. But as suggested in the Bluefield Water 
Works case, he sought a middle ground in simulta-
neously restraining both the state agency and the pri-
vate enterprise. 
As with exercises of state power, so with those of the 
national government, the North Carolina jurist proved 
no "man against the state." His decisions in major civil 
and criminal litigation favored the federal government 
as against the interests of private businesses, even inno-
cent enterprises. Broad construction of national com-
merce power was manifested in his controversial labor 
injunction opinion, United Mine Workers of America v. 
RedJacket Consolidated Coal and Co., involving 
application of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act to unionization 
campaigns.zs Parker's judicial record likewise reveals a 
propensity for defending the essential tenet of the New 
South creed: regional economic growth. His record sug-
gests an abiding concern for providing federal judicial 
protection to the region's economic infrastructure, to 
its public utilities and rail carriers as well as to its 
shippers, entrepreneurs, and consuming members of the 
public. His search for the point at which interstate 
freight rates applied reflect this concern. So too did 
constraints placed on the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission in his Lake Cargo decision, a decision which 
encouraged public policy favorable to a labor-intensive 
industry of the New South in its intersectional com-
petition for markets.26 RedJacket also manifested a 
Similar interest on Parker's part. But tl1at case forced a 
balanCing of deeply felt sympathy for laboring men anc 
women, a sympathy articulated in his gubernatorial 
campaign addresses and in other judicial decisions 
involving members of the working class. Yet, his moder-
ate treatment of the scope of the injunction affirmed 
against John L. Lewis and his United Mine Workers of 
America went largely unnoticed in the passionate 
debates on confirmation. And, in the boiling cauldron 
of Supreme Court confirmation politiCS a jurist bearing 
New South progressive credentials became a veritable 
political ogre to critical elements of Franklin Roosevelt'l 
future constituency. 
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Moral Values in Legal Education 
Richard C Maxwell* 
The American Bar Association 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 
adopted in 1983, provide that a law-
yer acting as advisor to a client may 
properly "refer to relevant moral and 
ethical considerations in giving 
advice." Further, a lawyer may tenni-
nate the representation of a client if 
"the client insists on a repugnant or 
imprudent objective." If moral values 
are to guide professional action, it is 
fair to ask to what extent moral edu-
cation is a part of the law school 
experience. 
Law schools teach law; that is, 
they teach a body of principles, rules, 
and decisions. They also teach a way 
of working with these formulations 
in their application to that level of 
reality which stands as facts in the 
classroom. Lawyers must try to pre-
dict what will happen to their clients 
if a particular course of action is 
taken. They must also try to achieve a 
beneficial result if their clients have 
already taken ill-advised actions. To 
relate these objectives to moral con-
siderations suggests that the lawyer's 
evaluation of the client's situation can 
be gauged by some accepted moral 
standard. 
If that standard can be found in 
religion, the source and authority of 
the values applied are comfortably 
explicable in traditional terms. If, 
however, the reference is to a moral 
order not founded on generally 
accepted divine revelation, actions 
taken in its name must be defended 
pragmatically or by reference to the 
human reasoning process. Personal 
moral standards applied in a legal 
context are bound to be affected by 
the moral underpinnings of the legal 
system. 
American law no longer operates, 
even verbally, as though it rested on 
supernatural foundations. Legisla-
tures and judges declare law in the 
American system and when the legis-
latures declare it, the courts interpret 
Richard Mcu'Well 
it and sometimes, using the Consti-
tution, our closest equivalent to pub-
licly accepted holy writ, pronounce 
its nullity. 
The work of judges and legisla-
tors is frequently subjected to critical 
analysiS. Sometimes this process 
focuses on the technical nuances of 
how the job has been performed but 
frequently the criticism seems to 
measure tl1e results against some sys-
tem of values, assuming standards 
that go beyond a personal morality. 
The idea that such standards are 
being utilized is strengthened by the 
fact that law exists to govern relation-
Law exists to govern 
relationships between 
human beings and not the 
actions of individuals in a 
vacuum. 
ships between human beings and 
not the actions of individuals in a 
vacuum. 
If the moral content of law is not 
referred for authority and substance 
to a formal religiOUS matrix, from 
what source is this element of the 
system derived? Lawyers, in commo( 
with otl1er human beings, bring to 
any decision or assertion of opinion 
a melange of beliefs, traditions, and 
intuitions as to what is good, bad, 
useful, and destructive. Sometimes 
these elements have been carefully 
nurtured in the formal study of reli-
gion, philosophy, history, or eco-
nomics. The study of law itself can 
also supply a source of guidance 
for decisions on moral matters. 
The law consists of a myriad of 
determinations and judgments on 
human relationships. In law school, 
many of these determinations are 
studied and weighed against each 
other, and against the beliefs, tradi-
tions, and intuitions which faculty 
and students bring into the class-
room. In this sense, a great deal of 
law school time is spent in moral 
education. Meaning is given, in rela-
tion to particular facts, to such words 
as justice, fairness, and responsibilit}j 
Yet, questions of ends and values are 
a part of legal education only within 
a rather narrow professional 
framework. 
Law students, in common with 
other human beings, have a taste for 
certainty, but legal education does 
little to satisfy it. The process subject.' 
assertions of certitude in the gover-
nance of human affairs to severe tests. 
This aspect of the educational expe-
rience extends to moral values. It 
becomes obvious that human reason 
is a limited tool for resolving in a 
satisfying way differences in the 
beliefs to which people adhere. It is 
possible that students are left with 
the idea that it is not productive to 
spend too much time in thinking 
about tl1e ageless questions of good 
and evil. 
In many professional situations 
the values involved are seen to be 
gi\'en--they are the values of the 
client. Law is viewed as a means for 
achieving goals which the client 
wishes to achieve. A faith emerges, 
but it is a faith in process: that the 
application of reason within a proce-
dural structure governed by the gen-
eral values of the Constitution will 
produce good long term results for 
society or, at least, an acceptable 
resolution of a current problem. 
The idea of improving the human 
condition in the long run or of 
decently resolving a dispute between 
indi\'iduals in the short run includes 
value judgments as to what is 
improvement and what is decency 
Many law students bring with them 
to law school strongly held views of 
how the world should work. As their 
perception as to how the world does 
work diverges from this model, their 
expectations of attaining a profes-
Sional role that will fulfill their high 
ideals and values may moderate. 
It is in the examination of the 
Law students ... have a 
taste for certainty, but legal 
education does little to 
satisfy it 
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demands of the professional role that 
the law school has found its most 
important mechanism for the direct 
discussion of moral issues. As noted 
at the outset of this discussion, the 
Rules of Professional Conduct make 
direct reference to moral standards, 
providing for "optional withdrawal" 
from representation of a client who 
wishes to take an advantage of 
another that the lawyer finds "repug-
nant." This advantage is by hypothesis 
legal, since an illegal course of con-
duct, under the Rules, calls for 
"mandatory withdrawal" from repre-
sentation of the client who insists 
upon it. Where the results the client 
seeks are merely "repugnant;' the 
lawyer's course of action is a matter 
of individual preference. If one law-
yer withdraws, the client is free to 
seek another who will exercise his 
individual moral preferences 
differently 
What does this mean for the pro-
fessional education of lawyers? The 
tradition of loyalty and commitment 
to the client will often mean that the 
lawyer will choose to give candid 
moral advice to the client but will 
then follow the client's wishes and 
do for the client's cause, if that is the 
client's wish, that which is lawful 
even though unfair or unjust. At the 
action stage of the lawyer/client rela-
tionship, the value system of the 
At the action stage of the 
lawyer/Client relationship) 
the value system of the 
lawyer becomes irrelevant 
lawyer becomes irrelevant. It is to be 
hoped, however, that some expe-
rience in examining troubled situa-
tions in terms of moral values will 
increase a student's skill in dealing 
with such problems and lend force to 
the use of "relevant moral and ethical 
considerations in giving advice." At 
least, a student so exposed will enter 
practice sensitized to the difficulty of 
asserting non-obligatory moral prin-
ciples when acting in a professional 
role which places a very high value 
on loyalty to the client. 
*Richard C. Maxwell is the Harry R. 
Chadwick, Sr., Professor in the School 
of Law. This essay appeared in Duke 
University Letters (Sept. 5, 1984). 
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Thoughtson 
Attorney Competence 
J Porter Durham * 
Lord Coke captured the essence 
of the problem which those con-
cerned about young lawyer compe-
tence clearly see: 
No man can be a complete lawyer 
by universality of knowledge with-
out experience in particular cases, 
by bare experiences without univer-
sality of knowledge; he must be 
both speculative and active, for the 
science of laws, I assure you, must 
joyn hands with experience. 1 
Each day, the law student encoun-
ters the handiwork of incomplete 
lawyers and the criticisms of a law-
yer-weary society Often, the cases 
studied exhibit poor legal skills 
which leave one party without ade-
quate representation and at the 
mercy of an unsavory opponent with 
a weaker case. Although such study is 
the prevalent method of "learning 
the law," many students believe the 
experience one-dimensional, lacking 
in practical content. After three years 
of casebook learning and a few 
selected encounters with limited 
clinical programs, the graduate is 
expected to pass the bar and begin 
practice, completely prepared and 
fully "competent." 
During the past fifteen years it 
has been argued that the novitiate, as 
well as the profession as a whole, 
lacks some yet defined quality or 
status. Some in the profession believe 
that there is an absence of skill at 
bar-an inability to do whatever it is 
that lawyers are supposed to do. 
Howard H. Kestin, chief administra-
tive law judge and director of the 
New Jersey Office of Administrative 
Law, has said flatly: 
Law practice is both a science and 
an art. Law school graduates have 
firm foundations in the science of 
law, but they know little of the art of 
]. Porter Durham 
practice-the application of the sci-
ence-perhaps less than their 
entering counterparts in other 
professions.2 
Others suggest that tl1ere are 
problems with the lawyer's attitude 
and personal skills. As Professors 
Shaffer and Redmount have stated: 
Lawyers prefer an impersonal cool-
ness. They avoid strictly human 
encounters. They seize . .. oppor-
tunities to put distance between 
themselves and people who need 
them. Problems are seen as oppor-
tunities for investigation, defense, 
abstract persuasion, and argument, 
rather than as opportunities for 
involvement. Even when tlle prob-
lem calls for moralism ... the mor-
alism selected is the lawyer's 
moralism: lawyers are uninterested 
in the moral impulses of their 
clients. 
[Lawyers] tend to deal with human 
feelings by ignoring tl1em when 
possible, and battering them away 
when they will not be ignored. They 
prefer faith in words to faith in 
people.3 
Still others contend that the 
American lawyer has 19st his social 
and public character. In the Preface 
to Joel Seligman's tbe High Citadel, 
Ralph Nader challenges lawyers and 
law schools to remember the unique 
public character of their mission, as 
summarized by AZ. Reid years 
earlier: 
Practicing lawyers do not merely 
render to the community a social 
service, which the community is 
interested in having them render 
well. They are part of the governing 
mechanism of the state. [L]awyers 
were instituted, as a body of public 
servants, essential for the mainte-
nance of private rights.4 
The criticism and the not so 
subtle reminders of our professional 
mission from within the profession 
have been matched in intensity by 
those outside of it. The public has 
little or no faith in the legal system, 
or in tl1e lawyer's ability to handle 
problems and to address the major 
issues of the day with skill or intel-
ligence. Ann Strick, in her book 
Injustice For All, broadly attacked the 
adversarial nature of the legal system 
and stated that it subverts justice and 
victimizes the victim.s Morris Harrel, 
ABA President from 1982 to 1983, 
argued that the public's lack of trust 
in the profession had become so 
intense that the ABA should commit 
whatever resources necessary to 
enhance the public's understanding 
of the profession and to deliver the 
"highest quality of justice" possible.6 
Historically, the lawyer has suf-
fered great slings and arrows. Stu-
dents are told routinely that this 
criticism is attributable to the fact 
that lawyers are often litigious adver-
saries who find themselves embroiled 
in knotty problems which are 
unpleasant and highly personal. Law-
rers are the "champions" of unpop-
ular causes which are perceived as 
inherently evil or "lawless." However, 
this familiar litany has not satisfied 
those who continue to challenge the 
lawyer's character and his compe-
tence and to question his role in 
society 
Each day, the law student 
encounters the handiwork 
of incomplete lawyers and 
the criticisms of a lawyer-
weary society. 
In response to the criticism, and 
out of an awareness of some of these 
problems, many members of the pro-
fession and interested scholars have 
spoken out and offered criticisms of 
their own. Derek Bok has suggested 
that the law and tl1e legal system have 
become too obscure, too expensive, 
and too burdensome. He contends 
U1at the law schools are only havens 
for good minds unable to find otl1er 
direction, and that often, tl1e talent is 
wasted mere? President Giamatti of 
Yale has suggested mat undergrad-
uate schools should teach general 
and pre-law courses to better inform 
the public and better prepare the 
interested student.8 Justice Sandra 
Day O'Connor has been highly crit-
ical of law schools "preoccupied with 
legalisms" and neglectful of the 
teaching of practical skills and, per-
haps more importantly, ethical 
responsibility9 The American Bar 
Association has cited with approval 
the efforts of New Jersey and New 
Hampshire to strengthen the bar by 
requiring "transition education" 
between law school and law practice. 
However, at the same time it is 
admitted that the number of these 
programs is small and mat, overall, 
the competence problem is "so real, 
in fact, mat it qualifies as a crisis in 
our profession." 10 
In an effort to address tl1e "com-
petence problem" in North Carolina, 
the state bar association studied the 
feasibility of creating practical skills 
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courses, local bar support groups, 
and programs to strengthen trial 
advocacy skills. Those efforts were 
considered pOSitive post-law school 
steps toward acquainting the law 
school graduate with tl1e practical 
aspects of his profeSSion, thereby 
enhancing his professional com-
petence. It was believed that another 
possible benefit, increased "social" 
competence, would accrue as well. 
Perhaps this heightened senSitivity to 
social needs and a greater sense of 
professional commitment would 
restore to the profession some of tl1e 
elan that it has lost. 
However, tl1ese worthy efforts will 
be of little or no value if law school 
graduates who come to the bar are 
already "professional misfits" with 
little practical training, social inSight, 
or personal integrity Thus, the var-
ious state bars should focus meir 
attention not on "gap bridging" or 
transitional education, but on the law 
schools tl1emselves. What happens 
State bars should focus 
their attention not on ((gap 
bridging)) or transitional 
education, but on the law 
schools themselves. 
within a law school's walls is critical, 
because it is the seed bed of the 
profession. 
PRACTICAL TRAINING 
The desire to enhance the new 
lawyer's practical skills begs a 
broader question about the nature 
and form of legal education. Law 
schools currently rely, in large part, 
on a standard curriculum, taught 
using the casebook method and tl1e 
Socratic dialogue. Some believe, 
however, that law students should 
participate in a very different kind of 
educational experience before they 
ever reach the local bar. I I Stanford 
Professor Lawrence M. Friedman has 
argued that legal education should 
consist of one-half clinical training 
and one-half intellectual training-
essentially toughening the mind 
while honing the skills. 12 This course 
of study, known as "Curriculum B;' 
was tested at Stanford UniverSity and 
has, according to Professor Paul Brest, 
produced lawyers who are more 
skeptical, more sensitive, and more 
reflective, as well as more technically 
able.13 Duke Law School recently 
expanded its curricular and extra-
curricular programs to include a 
unique commercial practice course 
which pits one student team against 
anotl1er in Simulated commercialliti-
gation. The problems are created 
and tl1e progress of the actions are 
supervised by several attorneys across 
the country Duke's new Private Adju-
dication Center will provide needed 
negotiations experience to balance 
the emphasis on oral advocacy skills. 
These programs are, in effect, like 
those recommended in the Cramton 
Report, which argued strenuously for 
instruction in basic skills all lawyers 
need: effective writing, persuasive 
speech, proper negotiation tech-
niques, and personal counseling. 14 
By and large, however, the profes-
sion remains wedded to the conven-
tional methods of instruction. New 
topiCS of some significance are often 
forced into the casebook mold 
whether tl1ey fit or not. One impor-
tant example should be related. 
In the aftermath of tl1e Watergate 
scandal, me so-called "lawyers' 
scandal;' the study of legal ethics, 
using the ABA Code of Professional 
Responsibility, became a part of tl1e 
By and large ... the profes-
sion remains wedded to 
the conventional methods 
of instruction. 
law school curriculum. Unfortunately, 
rather than teaching mis course with 
very practical hypothetical situations 
as models over a semester, schools 
often wedge it into a one-week ses-
sion, using a casebook. Students go 
through the motions of "learning 
about" ethics, quickly complete the 
requirements, and lose, or never dis-
cover, the real significance of the 
subject matter. If anything, their cyni-
cism about "legal ethics" grows. 
SOCIAL COMPETENCE 
In 1617, Lord Bacon implored 
the justices of the Star Chamber to 
"[ dJo good to the people, love them, 
New topics .. . are often 
forced into the casebook 
mold whether they fit 
or not. 
and give them justice, [b Jut let it be 
as the Psalm saith, 'look for nothing 
in return, neither praise, nor profit.' " 15 
He was telling them to be mindful of 
the public welfare and of their 
responsibility as professionals to 
society generally; without thought of 
personal gain. He was describing 
what can be called social compe-
tence-the ability to deal with other 
lawyers, other troubled people, or 
complex moral or ethical dilemmas 
with sensitivity; patience, and con-
science. This type of "competence" is 
a vital complement to practical com-
petence and its renewal may well be 
the only way that the profession can 
rescue itself from low public esteem. 
Law students are usually bright, 
competitive people. They often bring 
to school great notions of peace and 
justice and certain skills which they 
hope will be refined to serve positive 
ends and to help them become "good 
lawyers."17 It is this combination of 
highly talented and highly motivated 
people which creates, in the law 
school, a fertile environment for dis-
course on sensitive and controversial 
topicS (within the context of the law). 
These same people, once graduated, 
take up the practice of law, or engage 
in other fields where their knowl-
edge may be applied. 
However, the practicing attorney 
is a reflection, not only of the skill 
and ideas he brought to the law 
school or of the training he received 
there, but also of the conditions 
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under which he was trained. Often, 
the progressive dialogues can 
become skewed, and the learning 
process cut off for many students by 
school reward systems which rein-
force certain narrowly defined skills 
or attributes while ignoring others. 
Students, in their drive to "succeed" 
in law school and win the honors 
that will assure easy job placement, 
distort healthy competition and fur-
ther charge an already intense envi-
ronment. As pressures mount, get-
ting on the law review or making the 
moot court team may become more 
impOltant than the learning and 
talent such activities seek to dis-
tinguish. Some choose to pursue 
these goals at any cost, with certain 
ends justifying any means. In this 
climate, it becomes easier to forget 
or to ignore the most important and 
most baSic of the lawyer's profes-
sional values: honor, duty to client, 
and community responsibility The 
conscience and character of the law 
student are often battered or broken 
by the law school process. Seldom 
recognized and never rewarded, they 
languish. The notions of peace and 
justice are buried by piles of cases 
and statutes, seldom to be heard 
from again. It has been argued that 
the debilitation of law students is not 
a function of the law school environ-
ment but of the inadequacy of the 
students themselves. A study con-
ducted by Dean Paul D. Carrington 
while at the University of Michigan 
Law Schoop8 indicated that one 
Students go through the 
motions of {(learning 
about" ethics ... and lose, or 
never disco Vet; the real 
significance of the subject. 
in seven Michigan law students 
"dropped out" emotionally and intel-
lectually without formally withdraw-
ing from school. Carrington catego-
rizes these people as either alienated 
or dissatisfied and suggests that the 
result of such poor attitudes is lower 
student and faculty morale. He argues 
that one way to avoid this problem is 
to identify, by profile, the people 
likely to become "turned-off;' "teed-
off;' or "overly lonely," and reject 
them before they enter the school. 
Yet, Professor Shaffer, in the 
Preface to Swygert and Battey's Maxi-
mizing the Law School Experience, 
The conscience and 
character of the law 
student are often battered 
or broken by the law 
school process. 
presents a peSSimistic view of the law 
school's interaction with and devel-
opment of personal character and 
conscience: 
It is not true that the American law-
yer-heroes found their moral sub-
stance in the profession. They found 
their moral substance ... in their 
families , their church , and their 
community. [L)awyers of character, 
lawyers worthy of moral leadership 
America thrusts on them, were good 
lawyers because they were good 
people to begin with. They had the 
goodness before they became law-
yers. The moral challenge in their 
learning the law was to hold on [to 
their integrity). 18 
CONCLUSION 
Students are told throughout 
their first year of law school that the 
experience will shape them profes-
Sionally If this is the case, perhaps 
the mold should be reexanlined. The 
public's perception of lawyers as fee-
chasing cutthroats, bent on winning 
at any cost may be accurate-and 
may be a direct result of a climate 
which is character-debilitating rather 
than character enhancing. The cur-
rent environment at many of the 
country's best schools stifles the vel)' 
ethical and human sensitivities with-
out which even the most technically 
proficient graduates cannot practice 
effectively Moreover, without these 
sensitivities, the lawyer cannot ade-
quatel), face the challenges which 
society places before him, or con-
front the problems which he, as a 
lawyer, cannot ignore. 
In order to achieve the goals of 
greater practical and social compe-
tence, the members of the legal pro-
fession must insist that law schools 
accept not only good students but 
good people as well; that they teach 
basic skills with basic theory; and that 
they frame the competitive spirit 
with conscience. Only if the legal 
profession reassesses some of its 
most basic assumptions about the 
form and nature of legal education 
and the current role of lawyers in 
society will it overcome the view of 
some within the profession and many 
outside of it that: 
[T]he things we admire in men, kind-
ness and generosity, openness, 
honesty, understanding, and feeling 
are the concomitants of failure in 
our system. And those traits we 
detest, sharpness, greed, acquisitive-
ness, meanness, egotism, and self-
interest are the traits of success. 19 
*j. Porter Durham, a 1985 j.D. grad-
uate and former President of the 
Duke Bar Association, presented the 
substance of this paper in a state-
ment to the Committee on the 
Competence of New Admittees of the 
North Carolina Bar Association, on 
March 30, 1984 
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"Freedom" & "Coercion"-
Vtrtue Words & Vice Words 
Peter Westen 
Peter Westen, Professor of Law at the University of Michigan, delivered the address 
excerpted below as the 1984-85 Currie Lecture at Duke Law School. The text will appear 
in full in a forthcoming issue of the DUKE LAW JOURNAL. Considerable controversy 
resultedfrom publication of The Empty Idea ofEquali~ 95 HARV. L. REv. 537 (jan. 
1982), an article with a theme similar to this lecture. Interestingly enough, Mr. Westen 
said he had changed his mind since writing the Equality article. He no longer feels we can 
segregate the language of law from that of everyday life. He now feels we should 
"unpack" such concepts to fully realize their hidden prescriptive/descriptive elements. 
Three special guests attended the Lecture: Mrs. Brainerd Currie and Mr. & Mrs. john H 
Lewis. Mrs. Currie's husband taught Conflict of Laws at Duke Law School; the lecture 
series is in his memory. Mr. Lewis aD. 1967) is the current patron of the lecture. Also in 
the audience were Professor Dellinger; who clerked with Mr. Westen on the Us. Supreme 
Cour~ and Professor Beale, who had been his student 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Much has changed since 1781 when ThomasJef-
ferson wrote of "freedom" and "coercion;' and even 
more since Plato discussed these topiCS two millennia 
hence. Different ways of life have engendered different 
societal and personal philosophies, values, and ideals. 
For instance, the United States' short lifetime has wit-
nessed the abolition of slavery, the demise of mon-
archies, the prohibition of torture, the banning of child 
labor, the prevalence of premarital sex, and the creation 
of no-fault divorce. 
Despite the world's vast transformations, we use the 
same phrases to laud and condemn. Very different con-
ceptions of good and evil are expressed with identical 
language: "freedom;' "equality," "justice;' "misery," 
"shame;' and "coercion." A major subset of the recur-
ring terms of moral discourse are "virtue words" and 
"vice words." 
Virtue words and vice words are both protean and 
nonlexically normative. 
First, like the Greek god Proteus, each has the capaCity to 
retain its own essential identity while Simultaneously 
assuming a variety of distinct and even contradictory 
forms. Virtue words and vice words possess ... the qual-
ity of being less than fully specified and hence ... cap-
able of further specification. 
Virtue words and vice words convey judgments of 
right or wrong without being defined as expressing 
normative values. 
Peter Westen 
[S]ome concepts in normative discourse, like the con-
cept of "rights" and the concept of "duress," are norma-
tive by definition. They are "value concepts .... " It is 
paradoxical to speak negatively of rights or to speak 
positively of duress, because the relationship between 
rights and legitimacy, and duress and illegitimacy, is not 
contingent. It is lexical. ... 
One does not misuse language when one condemns 
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equality or praises inequality, because while statements 
of equality and inequal ity tend to be statements of good 
and bad, and right and wrong, respectively, the relation-
ship between equality and virtue and inequality and vice 
is not lexical. It is contingent. 
Because virtue words and vice words are protean, 
they are versatile. Deeply-held moral beliefs can be 
expressed by the same term even though morally incon-
sistent. Because they are non-lexically normative, they 
Very different conceptions of good 
and evil are expressed with identical 
language. 
persuade without being condusory Moral discourse is 
tilted in the direction the speaker wishes, yet an oppo-
nent cannot protest that tile issue has simply been 
defined awa), Combined, these two features of virtue 
words and vice words generate great rhetorical force. 
"Freedom:' a virtue word prototype, will be ana-
lyzed in detail to enhance our understanding of its rhe-
torical power. 
Freedom is protean, because freedom is a single, generic 
concept that can Simultaneously encompass many dif-
ferent and morally contradictory conceptions .... Free-
dom is also non-lexically normative, ... it tends to be 
"laudatolT" without being defined as [such] .... [I]t is 
generally assumed to be something right and good; yet 
there is nothing contradictory about "bad" or "undesir-
able" ... freedoms. 
"Coercion:' a vice word prototype, will be "un-
packed" in the same manner to reveal its core concepts. 
Like freedom, coercion is a single concept that is suffi-
ciently open-textured to encompass a range of diverse 
and mutually inconsistent norms. As well, the word can 
be used correctly, yet advance normatively inconsistent 
positions. 
[Cloercion" .. . is generally derogatory, but there is 
nothing contradictory about the notion of justified or 
legitimate coercion. 
Shared notions of good and evil drive virtue words 
and vice words less than their connotative meaning. 
Much of their rhetorical force is semantic, not 
substantive. 
II. FREEDOM 
[Freedoms] consist of three impliCit terms; an agent or 
class of agents, X, who possess the stated freedom; a 
constraint or a set of constraints, Y, that inhibits agent X 
from doing or being something he may wish ... ; and the 
goal, Z, that constraint Y inhibits agent X from doing or 
being if he so chooses. The concept of freedom is a 
generic relationship among X, Y, and Z; It is the relation-
ship of an agent X,from a constraint Y, to do or be a goal, 
Z, that he may desire. 
Depending upon which of two relations exists 
between agents X and constraints Y, freedoms are either 
descriptive or prescriptive. While the distinction 
between these categories is Significant, both types of 
freedoms are equally genuine. Descriptive relation-
ships are where 
X is unconstrained by Y to pursue Z, without regard to 
whether he also ought to be unconstrained .... 
An example is "The prisoner is free to walk without 
shackles." From descriptive statements, nothing pre-
scriptive necessarily follows. 
The Bill of Rights refers to prescriptive freedoms. 
These exist where 
X stands in a relationship to Y and Z such that he is 
and ought to be unconstrained by Y to pursue Z. 
Every statement of freedom, then, expresses either 
an "is" or an "is and ought to be." 
To speak of "freedom; ' therefore, is either to say some-
thing neutral-[which] ... cannot be inferred to be 
either good or bad-or to say that something ought to 
be; but it is never to say that something ought not to be. 
To be sure, one can say that a particular descriptive 
freedom is undesirable, or that a particular prescriptive 
freedom is unsound, or that a particular agent ought not 
to be free from Y to pursue Z. But in order to convey that 
a particular freedom is unjust or unsound, one must say 
so expressly, because the word freedom ... does not 
itself ever say that "X ought not to be free from Y to do 
or be Z." 
III. COERCION 
Although a person who is coerced is not free, coer-
cion is not merely the converse of freedom. An agent 
can lose or gain freedom without being coerced. More-
over, unlike freedom, coercion presupposes a human 
agent (X-I). It is an interpersonal relation where one 
person affects tlle behavior of another. 
X-I must knowingly bring a constraint upon X for 
the purpose or with tile expectation of causing X to do 
or become 2-1 against her will. 
[T]he "absence of will" alone does not suffice to render 
the event "against the will" unless the event is also 
against [personal] wishes . . . . [Suppose a man] wanted to 
jump but being too scared to do so on his own, hoped 
someone would push him, we would not say that he 
entered the water "against his will." ... [0 ]ne can con-
strain X to do Z-1 "against the will" by so structuring the 
relative consequences ofX's doing Z-1 as opposed to not 
doing Z-1 as to cause X to choose [what] ... would not 
otherwise [be chosen). 
A constraint is coercive regardless of whether it 
achieves its purpose. The term "coerce" alone does not 
imply success, but "coerce into" does. 
To say that X-I "coerced X into" doing something means 
th:lt X chose to do something . . . that but for the con-
straint or promise of constraint X-I brought to bear, X 
would not have chosen to do. 
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X must also be aware of the constraint that X-I is 
bringing to bear to force the course of action, Z-I. 
Finally, coercion must render Z-1 more "eligible" 
(attractive) in X's eyes than it would otherwise be under 
the circumstances. It must supply the actor with a reason 
to do X-l's bidding. 
Like freedom, all coercion is either prescriptive or 
descriptive, depending on the relevant baseline. Pre-
scriptive, or normative, coercion leaves X in a worse 
position relative to a baseline level than she ought to be 
for refusing to do what X-I proposes. 
Descriptive coercion exists when X is left worse off 
than she otherwise expects to be, relative to a particular 
baseline. The combination of prescriptive and descrip-
tive qualities renders "coercion" a vice word. The essen-
tial elements of coercion, then, are: 
[AJ constraint or promise of a constraint, Y, that X-I 
knowingly brings to bear on X in order that X choose to 
do something, Z-I , that X would not otherwise do and 
that X does not wish to be constrained to do-where X 
knows that X-I is bringing or promising to bring Y to 
bear on him for that purpose, where Y renders X's doing 
Z-1 more eligible to X than Z-1 would otherwise be, and 
where Y leaves X worse off either than actually expected 
otherwise or than he ought to be for refusing to do X-I 's 
bidding. 
Iv. CONCLUSION 
What can we learn from "freedom" and "coercion" 
about virtue words and vice words? What gives freedom 
and coercion their protean, open-textured quality? What 
is it that makes "freedom" sound good and "coercion" 
sound bad without their being defined as good and bad? 
"Freedom" and "coercion" each have three features 
that explain their being virtue words and vice words. 
Both consist of certain fixed elements, as well as vari-
ables. They are, therefore, sufficiently elastic to encom-
pass morally inconsistent conceptions. 
The second significant feature that freedom and coer-
cion both possess is that neither can be reduced solely 
to prescriptive statements, because both also take 
descriptive forms .... [Finally], just as freedom and coer-
cion cannot be reduced exclusively to prescriptive state-
ments of "ought" or "ought not; ' they cannot be reduced 
exclusively to descriptive statements of "is." . . . 
Freedom and coercion are useful , because they serve 
the same purpose in moral discourse that large, all-
purpose vessels serve in the field: they can contain and 
carry a wide diverSity of particular contents without 
altering their nature .. .. The words "freedom" and "lib-
erty" are related, because they both refer to a relation-
ship in which an agent X is unhindered by a constraint Y 
to do something Z. But liberty is less versatile and, to 
that extent, less useful than freedom, because liberty is a 
subset of all freedoms. We use "liberty" to refer to a 
relationship in which a particular class of agents (i.e., 
purposeful agents) are unhindered by a particular class 
of constraints (i.e., human constraints), to pursue their 
goals ... . 
It is lingUistically useful to have special-purpose 
words like "liberty" that are tailored to a narrow range of 
tasks; but it is also linguistically useful to have multi-
purpose words like "freedom " that can perform many 
tasks. 
The same is true of the relationship berween "coer-
cion" and "duress." Coercion and duress are related, 
because they both involve threats that X-I brings to bear 
on X to do something, Z-I, that X would not othelwise 
choose to do. Coercion is broader and, to that extent, 
more versatile than duress; because duress is solely a 
prescriptive concept encompaSSing constraints to leave 
X worse off than she ought to be left, while coercion can 
encompass either prescriptive or descriptive constraints. 
Again, it is useful to have special-purpose words like 
duress that take only a prescriptive form. But it is also 
useful to have multi-purpose words like ... coercion that 
can express both descriptive and prescriptive 
relationships. 
Although the capacity of "freedom" and "coercion" 
to express both descriptive and prescriptive relations is 
hnguistically useful, it is also rhetorically treacherous 
because it 
causes us to unthinkingly blend the rwo kinds of rela-
tionships together. Instead of recognizing that prescrip-
tive freedoms are good because they are defined to be 
good, and that descriptive freedoms themselves are nei-
ther good nor bad, we carelessly come to believe that all 
freedoms are presumptively good. Instead of remem-
bering that prescriptive coercion is bad because it is 
defined to be bad, and that descriptive coercion itself is 
neither good nor bad, we carelessly assume that all coer-
cion is presumptively bad. Rather than demand moral 
argument in favor of particular freedoms, and moral 
argument against particular kinds of coercion, we come 
to believe that freedom is itself something to favor and 
coercion itself something to oppose . . . . 
[T]here is nothing in their being "freedoms" and 
"coercions" that makes them presumptively good or 
bad. A person who advocates a particular freedom 
ought to give reasons for believing that a particular X 
ought to be unhindered by a particular Y to pursue a 
particular Z. Calling it "freedom" is either a neutral 
description or a question-begging conclUSion, but it is 
not a reason for believing X ought to be unrestrained by 
Y to pursue Z. By the same token, a person who opposes 
a particular coercion ought to give reasons for believing 
that a particular proposal leaves X worse off than X 
ought to be left for refusing to do X-l 's bidding. Calling 
the proposal "coercive" is either a neutral description 
or a question-begging conclUSion, but it is not a reason 
for belieVing that X-I proposes to leave X worse off than 
X ought to be left. The danger with words like freedom 
and coercion is that by mixing descriptions with pre-
scriptions, they tend to persuade us not through . . . 
reasons but through tricks of language. They possess 
rhetorical force not by facilitating argument, but by 
bypassing it. They are words that lay claim to virtues 
they do not deserve, and to vices they do not possess. 
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A Conference Report 
GunControl 
A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the 
people to keep and bear Arm~ shall not be infringed - u.s. Constitution, amendment II 
The meaning of the second amendment to the Constitution and its impact on gun control legislation served as not only the beginning pOint, but also an underlying theme, of the 
Law and Contemporary Problems Edi tarial Conference 
on Gun Control. The conference, which was held at the 
Law School and the Sheraton University Center on 
October 19-21 , 1984, featured a great deal of spirited 
discussion in addition to the presentation of materials 
prepared for a forthcoming Law and Contemporary 
Problems Symposium on the issue. The conference host 
and moderator, as well as the Special Editor of the 
Symposium, was Don Kates, a San Francisco attorney 
known for his activity in the area of gun control. 
TI1e controversial nature of gun control was high-
lighted from the start of the conference, when it became 
apparent that the participants had diverse views of the 
meaning of the short, but ambiguous, second amend-
ment. The first topic of discussion, "The Second 
Amendment;' was introduced by Professor Robert 
Shalhope of the History Department of the UniverSity of 
Oklahoma, who presented a paper entitled "The Armed 
Citizen in the Early Republic." Professor Shalhope con-
centrated on explaining the premises underlying the 
amendment by examining the philosophical framework 
from which its authors began. He noted that, in the 
current controversy over private possession and use of 
firearms, those favoring freedom of individual owner-
ship stress the "right to bear arms" phrase while their 
opponents emphasize the "well regulated Militia" 
phrase to support arguments restricting the use of fire-
arms by those not connected with the militia. Professor 
Shalhope concentrated on the "interrelationship link-
ing arms, the individual, and society" as viewed through 
the eyes of eighteenth century libertarians. He con-
cluded that the individual right to bear arms was con-
sidered essential to prevent individuals from being sub-
jected to the tyranny of governments, while the "well 
ordered Militia" phrase was directed toward the philos-
ophy of communal responsibility for the safety of the 
community According to his reading of the reasons for 
the amendment, "The Second Amendment included 
both of its provisions because the Founders intended 
that both of them be taken seriously. They intended to 
balance as best they could individual rights with com-
munal responsibilities." 
Mr. Kates presented a slightly different historical 
viewpoint while summarizing an article he had written 
for the UniverSity of Michigan Law Review, 82 Mich. L. 
Rev. 204-273 (Nov. 1983). According to Mr. Kates, the 
view that tl1e second an1endment was intended to pro-
tect states' rights to arm their militias is based on a 
twentieth century definition of "militia": the eighteenth 
century viewpoint was that all citizens should be armed 
and ready to defend their colony. Mr. Kates stated, how-
ever, that even if one accepts the wider, individual rights 
view of the purpose of the second amendment, gun 
control is not altogether precluded. He found that the 
right to bear arms had three purposes in eighteenth 
century America: individual protection; citizen law 
enforcement; and military use. Thus, he concluded that 
any weapon that is not useful for all three purposes can 
be banned without violating the second amendment 
(for example, 22 caliber handguns could be banned 
because they have no military value). 
A third historical perspective was introduced by one 
of the commentators, Mr. David Caplan, a New York City 
attorney who, in addition to his patent law practice, is a 
member of the National Board of the National Rifle 
Association. Mr. Caplan suggested that the second 
an1endment should be analyzed in the context of the 
eighteenth centUlY common law right to bear arms, 
which protected all non-threatening private ownership 
and use of arms. According to him, there was a tremen-
dous communal benefit to allowing citizens to do away 
with felonious predators. Mr. Caplan also stressed that, 
insofar as private ownership of firearms presents a 
potential-albeit slight-threat of armed rebellion, 
that threat is a guarantee against a takeover of the 
government by despots. 
Finally, a pragmatiC view of the constitutional ques-
tion was offered by Professor William Murphy of the 
UniverSity of North Carolina School of Law: Professor 
Murphy pointed out that no constitutionally guaranteed 
rights, except the right to believe, are absolute; all of 
them are subject to being balanced away be ends vs. 
means analysis of an infringing law: Professor Murphy 
also pointed out that, even if one or more of the fore-
going historical analyses is correct, the Supreme Court 
has exhibited a tendency to make selective use of his-
tory-sometimes even ignoring it altogether. He also 
cautioned that any decision made by the Court on gun 
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control legislation would be based, at least in part, on 
contemporary policy 
The second topic explored on the first day of the 
conference was mandatory penalties for gun use. Pro-
fessor Alan Lizotte of the Rutgers University Department 
of Sociology discussed research that he had done with 
Majorie S. Zatz for the Center for the Study of]ustice at 
Arizona State University Professor Lizotte pointed out 
that one strategy that has been attempted for control-
ling the use of guns by criminals is the enactment of 
laws providing for enhanced sentences for those who 
commit a crime with a firearm. After reviewing other 
studies on the efficacy of these laws, he reported on his 
and Zatz's study, "The Use and Abuse of Sentence 
Enhancement for Firearms Offenses in California." They 
studied length of prison sentences given in felony con-
victions in California over a three-year period. They 
found that, although criminals who used a gun during 
the commission of a felony should have received a sen-
tence of at least one year longer than those who com-
mitted the same offense without a gun, this was not 
usually the case. In fact, it was only when they consid-
ered those who had been convicted of fil !e or more 
felonies within the three-year period that they found 
any statistically Significant variation in sentences between 
gun-users and those who committed their crimes with-
out the use of firearms. Thus, they concluded that 
whether mandatory sentence enhancement affects gun 
usage by criminals cannot be determined until judges 
begin enforcing the laws that have been written. 
Other participants in the conference included Pro-
fessor Robert Batey of Stetson University College of Law, 
who discussed "Stria Construction of Firearms Offenses: 
The Supreme Court and the Gun Control Act of 1968;' 
concluding that the Court's liberal reading of that act 
has led to "abusive investigations and dubious prosecu-
tions; ' which, in turn, have strengthened opposition to 
"even the mildest forms of gun contro!''' Professor James 
B. Jacobs, of the New York University School of Law, 
considered "Exceptions to a General Prohibition on 
Handgun Possession: Do They Swallow up the Rule?" 
Professor Jacobs pointed out that even statutes that pur-
Those favoring freedom of individual 
ownership stress the ((right to bear arms" 
phrase while their opponents emphasize 
the ((well regulated Militia" phrase. 
portedly prohibit private ownership and use of hand-
guns, such as the widely publicized Morton Grove, 
Illinois, law, contain broad exceptions for police officers, 
private security guards, gun collectors, and so on, thus 
leading one to question whether these laws can prop-
erly be characterized as "prohibiting" firearms. 
Professor Daniel D. Polsby of Northwestern Univer-
Sity School of Law offered "Reflections on Violence, 
Guns and the Defensive Use of Lethal Force." Analyzing 
the self-defensive use of firearms, in part under "games 
strategies;' Professor Polsby concluded that "some 
amount of private gun possession" might be helpful in 
"keeping violence in the world to a minimum." Pro-
fessor Polsby's use of utilitarian theory was challenged 
Whether mandatory sentence enhance-
ment affects gun usage by criminals 
cannot be determined until judges begin 
enforcing the laws. 
in a thoughtful essay, "Close Encounters of the Lethal 
Kind: The Use of Deadly Force in Self-Defense," pre-
sented by Professor Lance Stell of the Davidson College 
Department of Philosophy 
Professor Margaret Howard, of the Vanderbilt Uni-
verSity School of Law, gave the last presentation on the 
second day Her presentation on "Husband-Wife Homi-
cide: An Essay from a Family Law Perspective" provided 
some intriguing information (for instance, current 
studies show that in spousal homicide cases, husbands 
and wives are victims in approximately equal ratios, 
although more wives are killed in the bedroom while 
more husbands are killed in the kitchen), but Professor 
Howard was unable to determine whether gun control 
legislation would alleviate the problem of spousal 
homicides. 
On the final day of the conference, Professor Gary 
Kleck of Florida State UniverSity'S School of Crimi-
nology discussed "Policy Lessons from Recent Gun 
Control Research." After finding that privately owned 
guns do have defensive value for their owners and do 
deter criminal behavior to some extent, Professor Kleck 
concluded that the status quo as to private gun owner-
ship should be maintained for the most part. He would, 
however, support laws prohibiting the sale of guns to 
those with a history of violent mental instability or a 
record of violent criminal offenses. He would also sup-
port a registration or licensing system by which civil 
liability could be imposed on those who transferred 
guns to someone without a permit. 
The final presentation on the agenda, a discussion 
by Don Kates and Professor Phil Cook of Duke Uni-
verSity'S Institute of Policy Sciences on "Strict Liability 
for Gun Manufacturers; ' was cancelled because the 
intense discussions on the earlier topics had caused the 
schedule to go awry 
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A Conference Report 
Federal Regulation of Work 
"F ederal Regulation ofWork from Recruitment 
to Retirement" was the title given to a con-
ference held at the Law School on November 
17-18, 1984. The conference was sponsored 
by Duke Law School Professors Richard Ma\.'Vvell, 
Donald Horowitz, and C. Allen Foster. The articles pre-
sented at the conference will form the nucleus of a 
forthcoming issue of Law and ContemporalJl Problems, 
for which Professor Horowitz will serve as Special Editor. 
The focus of the conference was on federal laws 
enacted during the 1960's and 1970's that affected the 
employment relationship. Particular focuses of discus-
~ ion were laws dealing with employment discrimination, 
health and safety regulation in the workplace, and retire-
ment programs and policy 
TIle first morning of the conference dealt with the 
subject of older workers. Following a welcome by Dean 
Paul Carrington and a short introduction by Professor 
Horowitz, Professor Marilyn Yarbrough of the Univer-
Sity of Kansas School of Law discussed the Age Discrimi-
nation in Employment Act (ADEA) and its impact on 
displaced homemakers. (Displaced ho memakers are 
women who have been out of the workforce and depen-
dent on their husbands for income, but whose ties to 
um income have been severed due to divorce, death, 
or other separation from their husbands.) Professor 
\arbrough focused on the possibility of using "disparate 
impact theory," as well as "disparate treatment theory," 
to redress employment discrimination against displaced 
homemakers attempting to return to the work force. 
A1Ulough not all courts accept the applicability of dis-
parate impact theory, which was developed in race 
discrimination actions under Title VII , to ADEA claims, 
Professor Yarbrough noted that a case brought under 
um theory should be easier for a displaced homemaker 
[0 prove than would be a case brought under the dis-
parate treatment theory more often used in ADEA cases. 
In the second presentation to focus on o lder work-
ers, Professor Merton Bernstein of Washington Univer-
Sity Law School discussed the Employment Retirement 
Income Security Act (ERlSA), and particularly, the fail-
ures and shortcomings of private pension plans, which 
induced the federal government to enact ERlSA in 1974. 
Commentary on the morning's presentations was offered 
by Allen Foster, Professor Emeritus Arthur Larson, and 
111eodore Rhodes, of the Washington, D.C. , law firm of 
Steptoe &Johnson. 
Health and safety in the workplace was the concern 
of the afternoon's presentations. Professor W Kip Viscusi 
of Duke University's Fuqua School of Business dis-
Donald Horowitz 
cussed 'The Structure and Enforcement ofJob Safety 
Regulation" under the Occupational Safety and Health 
Act (OSHA), and Professor Elinor P. Schroeder of the 
University of Kansas School of Law discussed "Compen-
sation for Occupational Disease." Professor Viscusi was 
critical of the federal government's handling of safety 
questions under OSHA and Professor Schroeder echoed 
his sentiments while discussing proposed federal legis-
!ation to compensate workers suffering from asbestos-
related illnesses. She noted that "[tJhe same kind of 
delay and industry opposition that has plagued OSHA 
could easily befall a federal occupational disease com-
pensation system." 
The focus during the second day of the conference 
was on employment discrimination law, particularly 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The two presen-
tations reviewing the first twenty years under Title VII 
were particularly interesting because the speakers pre-
senting the two sides of the issue had often faced each 
other in tlle courtroom. Discussing the employer's side 
of the issue were Thornton H. Brooks and M. Daniel 
McGinn of the Greensboro, N.C., firm of Brooks, Pierce, 
McLendon, Humphrey & Leonard. They discussed 
"Second Generation Problems Facing Employers in 
Employment Discrimination Cases: Continuing Viola-
tions, Pendent State Claims, and Double Attorneys' Fees." 
Although Mssrs. Brooks and McGinn felt that the use of 
continuing violation theory and the appending of state 
law claims to Title VII cases greatly expanded the bur-
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den on the employer, they appeared even more con-
cerned with the chilling effect on the defense of an 
action brought about by the employer's prospect of 
being forced to pay not only its own attorneys' fees, but 
also those of the plaintiff. They noted that, in several 
recent cases, employers have been forced to pay plain-
tiffs' attorneys' fees of $2,000,000 and more, in addition 
to backpay awards to the plaintiffs and their own attor-
neys' fees. They concluded that some system must be 
devised to handle employment discrimination claims 
without the tremendous expenses currently involved in 
litigation. 
Presenting the plaintiffs' view of twenty years of Title 
VII wasjulius L. Chambers, now Director of the NAACP 
Legal Defense Fund, but formerly a direct adversary of 
Mssrs. Brooks and McGinn as a member of the former 
Charlotte firm of Chambers, Stein, Ferguson & Becton. 
Although Mr. Chambers agreed that new ways to litigate 
Title VII cases should be found, his concern was that 
these new ways must lead to the provision of mean-
ingful relief for victorious plaintiffs. He noted that the 
provision of meaningful relief was hindered by the 
Supreme Court's expansive reading of the "bona fide 
seniority system" exception to Title VII and by the 
Reagan administration's opposition to affirmative action 
In fact, he concluded, despite twenty years of litigation, 
Title VII appears not to have accomplished its aims; the 
continuing earnings and unemployment gap between 
blacks and whites indicate that much remains to be 
done. 
The final presentation of the conference was an 
extremely lucid discussion on the statistical proof of 
employment discrimination through utilization of mul-
tiple regression analysis. Barbara A. Norris, a solo prac-
titioner from Albany, California, managed to make mul-
tiple regression analysis seem understandable, a truly 
amaZing feat in the eyes of any nonstatistician who has 
ever attempted to fathom the mysteries of the subject. 
Commentary on the mornings' presentations was offered 
by Professor Douglas Laycock of the University of Texas 
Law School. 
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A Conference Report 
Tax Symposium 
T he tax legislation enacted during President Reagan's first term and that proposed early in his second term were the topics of discus-sion at a symposium held at the Law School, 
January 10-12. Professor Richard Schmal beck, who 
organized the symposium in conjunction with Law and 
Colltemporary Problems, described the goal of the 
conference: 
We wanted to examine why we have had the explo-
sion of tax legislation in recent years, what that legisla-
tion has done to our t<L,( system, and where we might be 
headed in the future. The papers presented were a mix 
of comprehensive treatments of these major themes, 
and more concrete analyses of specific applications. 
During the first day of dle symposium, participants 
took a retrospective view of the tax changes which have 
occurred over the past four years. Session topics 
included "Movement toward a Consumption Base;' pre-
sented by Professor Charles O. Galvin of Vanderbilt 
University Law School; "ReaganomiCS: The Revolution 
in American Political Economy," presented by Rutgers 
University Professor Charles E. Jacob, and "T<L'Cation of 
Capital Income;' presented by Duke Law School Pro-
fessor Pamela B. Gann. 
Professor Galvin began his presentation by describ-
ing the accretion system of taxing income. Under a pure 
accretion system, all assets would be ipventoried each 
year, liabilities would be deducted, and the taxpayer's 
net worth would be determined at market value. The 
difference between beginning year and end-year net 
worth, plus the taxpayer's expenditures for consump-
tion for the period, would reflect the taxpayer's taxable 
income for the year. Such a pure system would, in 
Galvin's estimation, "immeasurably simplify the Code 
and tax each individual on real economic income." It 
""ould also mean the elimination of provisions regard-
ing income excluSion; consumption deductions such as 
personal interest and taxes, medical expenses, and 
charitable contributions; tax free exchanges; corporate 
reorganizations; and the capital gain-ordinary income 
distinction. "Only through such a system could we 
expect as simple and as equitable a statute as we could 
hope to devise in a complex economy involving over 
200 million people." 
Galvin noted, however, dlat there are significant 
objections to such a system. These objections are, pri-
marily, that asset valuation each year would be difficult 
for the taxpayer to determine and the IRS to administer; 
that taxpayers with substantial asset appreciation could 
have significant wherewithal! problems at tax time; and 
that the transitional problems of providing everyone 
with a "fresh start" each year would be troublesome. 
Richard Schmalbeck 
Under an accretion system, according to Galvin, 
upper bracket taxpayers would pay more tax, even 
dlough rates would remain constant, because net 
unrealized appreCiation, currently excluded accessions 
to wealth, and large consumption expenditures would 
fall into the base, making it larger. Galvin speculated 
that "[ t ]he overall effect of using the same rates would 
be to raise somewhat more than twice the revenue as at 
present, [and] to shift disproportionately more of that 
additional burden to the upper brackets: ' Lower and 
middle income t<L'Cpayers would pay more than they do 
currently to the extent that deductions were disallowed. 
However, this would be a proportionate increase, with 
lower income taxpayers relying on the zero bracket 
amount to cover personal deductions. 
Professor Galvin then discussed the consumption 
system, in which taxpayer savings and investment fall 
outside of the tax base. The base, under this system, is 
measured by only that amount which is consumed 
during the period. For the vast majority of taxpayers in 
the middle and lower brackets, this system would pro-
duce results similar to those of the present system, widl 
the exception that currently deductible personal con-
sumption items would be included in the base, thereby 
enlarging it. For upper bracket taxpayers, the base 
would be smaller because capital income would drop 
out of the system. 
In Galvin's opinion, the exclusive use of one of 
these systems would be preferable to the present system, 
which is a messy hybrid of the two, designed in random 
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fashion to promote various social and economic goals. 
The current system, however, has failed to achieve 
broadly these goals and has resulted in unfairness 
throughout and wide-scale evasion. Thus, concludes 
Galvin, the President's tax reform efforts should focus 
on moving toward a pure accretion system or a pure 
consumption system. But, cautions Galvin, neither sys-
tem would provide adequate revenue to overcome the 
federal deficit and payoff the national debt, given the 
present rate structure. He therefore suggests that a 
broad based value added tax (VAT) system should be 
layered on top of a new system, with appropriate min-
imum or vanishing credits to protect lower bracket 
taxpayers. 
Professor Charles Jacob shifted the day's discussion 
to an assessment of Reagonomics, which spurred lively 
conversation and sharp criticism from Duke Political 
Science Professor James David Barber. Jacob began his 
presentation by asserting that "the first year of the 
Reagan Administration produced a set of changes in 
political-economic relationships so novel as to merit 
the denomination revolutionary" The evidence of such 
a revolution, arguedJacob, lay in the specific actions of 
the Administration: a reduction in personal taxes of 
thirty percent over three years; accelerated depreciation 
allowances for bUSiness; 49 billion dollars in domestic 
program spending cuts; and a non-incremental approach 
to defense spending. Jacob went on to say that these 
fundamental alterations in American domestic revenue 
collection and spending policies were the result of the 
application of specific political resources marshalled by 
the Administration: to set the policy agenda, to secure 
adoption by Congress, and to manage the people 
involved in the process. One of the most significant 
resources used in the "revolution;' according toJacob, 
was the presidential leadership exhibited by Ronald 
Reagan. His ability to adhere uniformly to basic values 
and political concepts, such as an unfettered economy 
and the primacy of individualism, and to manage subor-
dinates and public opinion effectively, created an envi-
ronment and a system ripe for revolutionary changes. So 
A pure accretion system ... would .. . 
((immeasurably simplify the Code and 
tax each individual on real economic 
income." 
effective was the revolution, asserted Jacob , that the 
Congress passed dle Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsi-
bility Act (TEFRA) a year later. Yet,Jacob assessed thi 
move as a "Thermodorean reaction;' rather than a 
counter-revolution-an event which involved consoli-
dation and fine tuning of the Reagan revolution. 
Reacting to the presentation, Professor James David 
Barber argued that Reagan's 1981 legislative victories 
were primarily explained by a conjunction of political 
circumstances, such as media misinterpretation oftbe 
1980 election, the disarray of the Democrats, and the 
accident of his near assassination. Such circumstances 
are unlikely to be repeated. or does tbe evidence sup-
port the supposition that American political values have 
changed or that the Reagan "revolution" represents the 
death or lapse of top level pragmatiSm. 
The neutral taxation of capital income was the topiC 
of Professor Pamela Gann's presentation. As Gann 
explained, the first Reagan Administration responded to 
the poor economic performance ofthe late 1970's and 
early 1980's as if income ta.,"{ation of capital were "the 
culprit." The Economic Recovery Tax Act CERrA) low-
ered the effective tax rates on capital income even 
though Administration economists and others were 
unsure to what the nation's sluggish and inflationary 
economy was to be attributed. Some argued that over-
taxation of capital income was resulting from the inter-
action of an unindexed tax base and high inflation. 
Others countered that overall effective tax rates had not 
Significantly increased because of inflation and that the 
economic slowdown was a function of more profound 
social and economic forces and in only small measure 
attributable to the federal income tax. 
Neverdleless, Gann continued, the Administration 
proceeded with ERTA, a package of "reforms" which 
unevenly lowered effective tax rates and left the base 
unindexed. With the lowering of inflation, the ERTA 
system created a new imbalance which resulted in "vel)' 
low positive and even negative effective tax rates for 
many investments." These misallocation effects have 
prompted those involved in policy making to urge that 
capital income should be taxed more neutrally with 
respect to investment choice. 
Gann then argued that a neutral income tax system 
was achievable even though detractors argued that the 
creation of a neutral system would require more polit-
ical will than Congress can muster, and a more precise 
measure of capital income than has yet been seen. 
Gann suggested that the major problems with income 
measurement had been solved in large part and that at 
no time before had there been a more clear under-
standing of the workings of a neutral system. In fact, the 
Treasury Department's 1984 tax reform proposals dem-
onstrate that elements of neutrality can be placed in 
legislative form and administered if passed. The pri-
mary stumbling block, believed Gann, was the mood of 
Congress. She concluded by asking "where is the polit-
ical will to achieve the goal of neutrality?" 
Interesting presentations were also made by Pro-
fessor Charles T. Clotfelter of the Duke University 
Department of Economics as well as Mr. Don S. 
Samuelson of Samuelson Associates in Chicago. Pro-
fessor Clotfelter's evaluation of "Charitable Giving and 
Tax Legislation in the Reagan Era" provided unusual 
insight into the changing patterns of charitable giving in 
the United States. His presentation demonstrated that, 
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although the Reagan philosophy relies heavily on the 
wi ll ingness and ability of the private sector to make a 
host of charitable contributions to support various social 
programs, the Reagan tax reform plans have the poten-
tial of having a negative impact on charitable giving. In 
1983, individual donors contributed 54 billion dollars 
to nonprofit charitable organizations. Bequests and cor-
porate contributions equalled 7 billion dollars. Current 
income and estate tax laws permit deductions for chari-
Reagan tax reform plans have the 
potential of having a negative impact 
on charitable giving. 
table gifts to individuals, while corporations may deduct 
charitable gifts of up to 10 percent of net income. The 
traditional view has been that an increase in tax liability 
causes a decline in contributions, while a tax cut stimu-
lates giving, if charitable giving is considered a normal 
good and demand for it increases as disposable income 
increases. 
However, Clotfelter asserted that the recent Reagan 
reforms, while creating a system under which more 
lower and middle income taxpayers were able to make 
charitable contributions, caused the cost of charitable 
giving to corporations and wealthy individuals to rise 
60 percent. Thus, between 1981 and 1986, gifts to reli-
gious organizations, given primarily by lower and 
middle income taxpayers, are expected to increase 14 
percent in real dollars. In sharp contrast, contributions 
to cultural organizations, colleges and universities , and 
other educational institutions are projected to decline 
between 14 and 17 percent, in real terms, because of 
the increased cost to upper-income individuals who 
support such programs and institutions. 
Likewise, in the estate tax area, Clotfelter foresees 
similar increased cost of giving and thus fewer contrib-
uted dollars generated than under the prior tax system. 
Yet, the giving picture is more promising now than if a 
"flat" tax were introduced. According to Clotfelter, the 
removal of the charitable deduction, along with all 
other such deductions, would remove the "subsidy" for 
giving which taxpayers now enjoy. Without this incen-
tive, it has been estimated that individual charitable 
contributions would drop by as much as one quarter. 
Mr. Samuelson's review of real estate ta.'(ation during 
the Reagan years focused on the use of municipal 
bonds. He recounted the specific, detailed provisions of 
municipal bond tax legislation of the Reagan years, 
noting that, in his opinion, none of the measures would 
have significant impact on municipal bonds as a whole. 
However, Samuelson pointed out that changes made in 
the law with respect to Industrial Development Bonds 
or "!DB's" would result in fewer issues and different 
purposes for those issues. Specifically, it was noted that 
the elimination of an exemption for certain types of 
small issue lOB's seemed to suggest that a public pur-
pose test would be imposed at the federal level during 
the small issue review process. Samuelson argued that 
the thrust of all such changes was to provide the federal 
government with more control over the uses of tax-
exempt financing and to limit the volume of tax exempt 
debt by reducing lOB borrowing. The result of increased 
controls on bonds and reduced availability of inexpen-
sive debt financing, San1uelson asserted, would be 
increased tax revenue for the government, lower yields 
on available exempt bonds, and increased ownership of 
bonds by the wealthy. This effect, in turn, would result 
in reduced benefits from tax exemption and an increase 
in the effective progressivity of the tax structure. 
The second day of the symposium was devoted pri-
marily to discussion of the Treasury Department's tax 
reform proposals first announced in December, 1984. 
Presentations were made by Mr. Willard B. Taylor of the 
Sullivan and Cromwell law firm in New York City, and 
Professor C. Gordon Bale of the law faculty at Queen's 
University in Canada. 
Mr. Taylor's paper outlined the recent changes to 
Subchapter C and the tax poliCies which lay behind 
those proposals. Taylor discussed the fact that changes 
in Subchapter C had been accompanied by a contin-
uing reduction in effective income tax rates. Interest-
ingly, the income tax receipts from corporations in 1950 
provided 28.3 percent of the total receipts for that year. 
By comparison, this figure had declined in 1981 to 11.5 
percent, and in 1983, to under 7 percent. Taylor went 
on to say that many of the changes made to Subchapter 
C strengtl1ened the system of double taxation of corpo-
rate income rather than achieving further integration. 
Changes which made the most difference included the 
elimination of non-recognition of income for distribu-
tion of property; the expansion of earnings and profits; 
the extension of the accumulated earnings tax provi-
sions; and the change in the treatment of acquisitions. 
While not faulting the changes wrought by Subchapter 
C legislation, Taylor did argue that the piecemeal repeal 
of the General Utilities doctrine was confuSing and 
distorting; that pass-through entities had not been ade-
quately treated; and that recapture provisions were 
inadequate to meet the demands of the Accelerated 
Cost Recovery System (ACRS). 
Dr. Bale provided conference participants with a 
Canadian view of the Treasury Department's proposals. 
Interestingly, the Carter Royal Commission developed 
many of the same reform proposals nearly two decades 
ago. As the Canadian government discovered, however, 
political realities greatly reduced the extent to which 
the measures could be implemented, even though the 
tax base would have been broadened and revenues 
enhanced. 
The symposium concluded with a round table dis-
cussion of all the proposals at issue. The discussion was 
conducted by Professor S. Malcolm Gallis of the Duke 
University Department of Economics. 
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Duke Goes to Phoenix 
Duke Law School has tradition-
ally sought to provide a high quality 
legal education that would prepare 
its graduates to practice in any area 
of the United States. At the same time, 
the school has endeavored to main-
tain a geographically diverse student 
body. It is therefore not surprising 
that quite a few Duke graduates today 
have successful and rewarding 
careers not only on the Eastern Sea-
board but also in distant cities such 
as Los Angeles, Houston, and San 
Francisco. 
It is perhaps somewhat more 
unusual to find Duke graduates prac-
ticing law in a city like Phoenix, Ari-
zona, often associated with movie 
westerns and the law of the six-gun. 
However, Phoenix has long outgrown 
its reputation as a rough and ready 
cowtown and a number of Duke 
alumni and alumnae are pursuing 
interesting careers there. 
The Phoenix metropolitan area, 
which includes such suburbs as the 
posh Scottsdale area and the univer-
Sity town of Tempe, now has a pop-
ulation of about 1.7 million. Phoenix 
proper has a population of approxi-
mately 790,000. The City has grown 
culturally as well. It has its own sym-
phony orchestra, a metropolitan 
ballet compan)~ and a number of 
museums. And, of course, Phoenix is 
renowned for its fair weather. 
Although temperatures soar well 
above the 100 degrees Fahrenheit 
mark in the summer months, PhoenL,( 
re idents enjoy winter temperatures 
in the 60's and 70's and sunshine 
60% of the year. 
The number of lawyers practicing 
in Phoenix has quadrupled in the 
past twenty years. On July 5, 1984, 
the Arizona State Bar Association esti-
mated that there were about 4,647 
lawyers in the Phoenix metropolitan 
area-3,600 in Phoenix proper. 
About thirty of those lawyers are 
Duke Law School graduates. They 
practice in a variety of areas, ranging . 
from medical malpractice to environ-
mental law. 
One Duke graduate is a highly-
respected judge on the Arizona Court 
of Appeals. Judge Thomas Klein-
schmidt grew up in Clayton, Missouri. 
He decided to attend Duke in 1962 
when a representative of the school 
visited his college. When he gradu-
ated in 1965, Kleinschmidt felt Duke 
had provided him with a "strong 
springboard from which to begin 
[his] career." Kleinschmidt chose to 
move to Phoenix after having clerked 
there for a summer withJennings, 
Strauss, Salmon & Trask, the prede-
cessor ofjennings, Strauss & Salmon. 
After being admitted to the bar in 
1966, Kleinschmidt continued to 
work atJennings, Strauss and eventu-
ally becanle a partner in the firm. 
Anticipating appointment to the 
bench and anxious to diversify his 
background, Kleinschmidt left 
Jennings, Strauss in 1971 to work for 
the Public Defender's Office under 
Tom Karas, another Duke alumnus. 
In 1977, Kleinschmidt was appointed 
to the Superior Court for Maricopa 
County He found trial work "enor-
mously satisfying" and earned a rep-
Roger Ferland 
utation as an excellent trial judge. 
Five years later, Kleinschmidt was 
appointed to the Arizona Court of 
Appeals. He finds the thoughtful 
analysis required by appellate work 
as rewarding as trial work. According 
to Karas, Kleinschmidt is "an out-
standing appellate judge." 
Anlong his recent opinions are 
State l~ Stewart, an armed robbery 
case which concerned the troubling 
issue of shackling defendants at trial, 
and State I I Ho!stun, which discussed 
the issue of whether or not a trial 
judge should be required to articu-
late his reasons for accepting a sen-
tence stipulated in a plea bargain 
when the stipulated sentence is to a 
term longer than the presumptive 
term for the reduced charge. 
Kleinschmidt enjoys his work 
immensely, and has a great deal of 
respect for the legal system in Ari-
zona. "It is largely free of the seanlY 
customs one hears of in some areas. 
... The system has a good clean tradi-
tion and works the way it should." 
Roger Ferland, unlike Klein-
schmidt, is a Phoenix native. He 
chose to attend Duke because of its 
reputation. He was unsure of where 
he wanted to practice after gradu-
ating and wanted to leave his options 
open. Ferland also found Duke's 
small urban setting appealing. Com-
menting on the education he 
received at Duke, Ferland said the 
school "taught me to think like a 
competent, ethical attorney." 
When Ferland graduated in 1974, 
he returned to Phoenix to practice. 
At that time, he became associated 
with Paul Castro's 1974 campaign for 
governor of Arizona. He was respon-
sible for drafting the candidate's 
issues papers. After the campaign, 
Ferland accepted an appOintment as 
Administrative Counsel for the Ari-
zona Department of Health Services. 
He assisted in the drafting of the 
Hospital Certification of Need Laws 
and Regulations and was involved in 
a number of administrative decisions 
made under them. While in that posi-
tion, Ferland said, "I saw Professor 
Havighurst's concepts substantially 
borne out in the real world." He also 
commented that he had perceived 
the direct influence of Professor 
Arthur Larson's work. 
In 1977, Ferland became Senior 
Counsel to the Environmental Pro-
tection Section of the Attorney Gen-
eral's Office. While there, he did 
environmental work exclusively. He 
was largely responsible for rewriting 
all of Arizona's Air Pollution Regula-
tions in 1979. The new regulations 
were innovative in that they com-
mitted to words a complex graph 
designed by University of Arizona 
specialists to ensure that, given varia-
tions in meteorological conditions 
and emissions content, there would 
never be excessive amounts of sul-
phur dioxide pollution in Arizona's 
atmosphere. 
Three and a half years after the 
regulations were submitted, they 
were approved by the Environmental 
Protection Agency. Shortly thereafter, 
the Environmental Defense Fund 
sued the Environmental Protection 
Agency for its approval of the regula-
tions. In Kamp v. Hernandez (Feb. 5, 
1985), a Ninth Circuit panel affirmed 
the EPA's approval of Arizona's "multi-
point implementation plan for the 
control of S02 emissions from cop-
per melters." The EDF petitioned for 
rehearing en bane. 
Since 1981, Ferland has been in 
private practice, doing environmental 
defense work for the Phoenix firm of 
Twitty, Sievewright & Mills. Ferland 
regards his practice as something like 
preventive medicine. He often 
requests his clients to read pertinent 
cases before meeting with him. "It is 
my firm belief that clients need to be 
educated about relevant issues of 
environmental law so that they can 
make intelligent decisions in their 
corporate planning." 
Ferland recently wrote an article 
on alternative regulatory approaches 
that appeared in the 1984 edition of 
the Rocky Mountain Mineral Law 
Institute. In September, he addressed 
a group of corporate environmental 
affairs specialists at a Hazardous 
Wastes Symposium held in Phoenix. 
He spoke about the legal issues that 
arise when a purchaser of real prop-
erty discovers the purchased land to 
be contaminated with hazardous 
wastes. 
According to Ferland, "The 
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From top left, clockwise: Andy Friedman, Al Shrago, Bob Hackett, Bill Kurtz. 
essence of environmental law is the 
resolution of conflict between the 
equally valid interests of the public 
in a clean environment and business 
in survival." Ferland finds the creative 
challenges involved in resolVing tl1at 
conflict particularly rewarding. 
Larry Haddy was born in Iowa 
and spent most of his life there until 
he went into the service. In 1968, he 
was stationed in Fort Huachaca, Ari-
zona, and "fell in love with the state." 
In 1970, when Haddy was in Vietnam, 
he was admitted to Duke Law School. 
"I still remember the day my mud-
splattered acceptance letter arrived 
in camp: ' Haddy returned to tlle 
United States to enter Duke that fall. 
Haddy had not forgotten his days 
in Fort Huachaca and decided to 
practice in Phoenix because it was 
tlle largest city in Arizona. He spent 
the summer after his second year 
working as a Superior Court bailiff in 
Phoenix and, after graduating in 
1973, he returned to Phoenix to clerk 
for the Honorable Walter E. Craig, a 
federal district court judge. Follow-
ing his clerkship, Haddy joined the 
small Phoenix firm of Carson, 
Messenger, Elliot, Laughlin & Reagan, 
where he became a litigation partner 
doing primarily bank and insurance 
defense work. 
In 1981 , the opportunity to strike 
out on his own arose and Haddy left 
Carson, Messenger. He and two other 
attorneys, Karasek and Rayes, set up 
an overhead-sharing arrangement. 
They share only common expenses; 
othelwise, each attorney is respon-
sible for his own risks and reaps the 
full benefit of his rewards. 
Haddy describes his present 
practice as a "general civil practice." 
He handles matters ranging from real 
estate and commercial litigation to 
personal injury and domestic rela-
tions cases. He also does some bank-
ruptcy work. Any criminal cases that 
come into the office are handled by 
his associates. 
Haddy finds the independence 
and diversity of his practice satisfy-
ing. He also very much enjoys living 
and working in Phoenix. "It's a vaca-
tionland year-round." According to 
Haddy, the city's warm and relaxed 
atmosphere is also reflected in the 
legal sphere. "Problems like late dis-
covery are often handled with a 
simple phone call; you don't have to 
file papers with the court." 
Three of four Duke graduates 
who are now members of the Phoe-
nix firm of Evans, Kitchell &Jenckes 
were also interviewed for this article. 
They share Haddy's appreciation of 
Phoenix's lifestyle and legal climate. 
Andy Friedman, a native of New 
Jersey, moved to Phoenix after gradu-
ating from Duke in 1978. What ini-
tially attracted him to Phoenix was 
Evans, Kitchell. The firm 's atmos-
phere and litigation practice appealed 
to him. Toda)~ he is a litigation part-
ner at tlle firm and handles a variety 
of civil cases. Friedman finds Phoenix 
culturally interesting and enjoys the 
fact that one can live in very pleasant 
neighborhoods within five minutes 
of one's job. He also appreciates the 
informal manner in which matters 
like extensions can be handled. 
AI Shrago, a member of the class 
of '77, is a native of North Carolina. 
He too moved to Phoenix after grad-
uating from Duke primarily because 
of Evans, Kitchell. He had clerked 
there after his second year and felt 
"the firm was the sort of place in 
which I could practice for the rest of 
my life." Like Friedman, Shrago is a 
litigation partner at the firm. Last 
February the United States Supreme 
COurt heard argument in Kerr-McGee 
Corp. L~ Navajo Tribe, a case in which 
Shrago was lead counsel for the busi-
ness. The Court decided that Kerr-
McGee will have to pay taxes, 
imposed by the Navajo tribe, on min-
eralleases on Navajo property. 
Phoenix, according to Shrago, is 
unique among cities of its size. "It's a 
major metropolitan area with most 
of the opportunities available else-
where, professionally and otherwise; 
yet it offers a more small-town quality 
of lifestyle:' In particular, it is a city 
that "offers attractive opportunities 
to lawyers recently graduated from 
law school." 
Bob Hackett graduated some ten 
years earlier than Shrago and 
Friedman. Professor Weistart was 
then a member of the student body 
After graduating, Hackett returned to 
New York to practice. He had spent 
four years with a Wall Street firm 
when Evans, Kitchell, as he put it, 
"made me an offer I couldn't refuse." 
He is now a partner in the firm's 
corporate department. Hackett 
misses neither the practice nor the 
lifestyle of New York. He finds Phoe-
nix "rich and diverse culturally" and 
he enjoys the more relaxed atmo-
sphere of the city. 
Friedman, Shrago, and Hackett 
share positive feelings about the 
quality of the legal education they 
received at Duke. Duke provided 
them with the analytical skills that 
they all agree are the key to good 
legal craftsmanship, whether in the 
field of litigation or corporate work. 
Friedman, in particular, remembers 
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Donald Beskind's Trial Practice 
course. He recalls, "Beskind opened 
my eyes to the fact that you don't 
have to be bombastic to be a good 
trial lawyer. The course was one of 
the primary motivating factors that 
led to my chOice to go into litigation:' 
Tom Karas, originally from Chi-
cago, moved to Phoenix after he 
graduated from Duke in 1959. Since 
that time, he has devoted his career 
to criminal law. Karas began his pro-
fessionallife as a Maricopa County 
Attorney He then went on to become 
an Assistant United States Attorney, 
Chief of the Criminal Division for the 
District of Arizona. 
In 1965, Phoenix became the 
home of the first Public Defender 
Pilot Program in the United States. 
Karas was asked to run the program. 
Of the nine lawyers Karas hired, five 
are now judges. Kleinschmidt was 
one of those five lawyers. Klein-
schmidt recalls, "Karas was wonder-
ful to work for. He was fiercely 
independent, scrupulously honest, 
diligent, and inventive about probing 
areas of the law to develop new 
rights:' 
Karas remembers how he and 
Kleinschmidt worked together on 
cases involving sections of the United 
States Code that then provided for 
punishment applicable only to Amer-
ican Indian criminal offenders. 
United States v. Cleveland was the 
first case in which the court held that 
such disparate punishment violated 
the equal protection component of 
the Fifth Amendment's Due Process 
Clause. Six or seven other sections 
fell in cases following United States v. 
Cleveland and the entire chapter was 
eventually amended to provide equal 
punishment for offenders of all races. 
In 1971, the Public Defender pro-
gram became national. Karas 
remained at the Phoenix office until 
1975, when he left to join Lewis & 
Roca, one of the largest firms in 
Phoenix. Karas had been a partner at 
Lewis & Roca for seventeen months 
when he decided that he needed 
more independence. He has been a 
sole practitioner ever since. 
Today, Karas is considered one of 
the foremost criminal defense law-
yers in Arizona. He is listed in both 
The Best Lawyers in America and The 
Directory of Legal Professions. About 
fifty percent of Karas's usual caseload 
involves charges of white collar 
crime; the rest are charges such as 
murder and rape. He is very selective 
about the cases he takes. They must 
involve fact situations or legal issues 
of particular interest to him. 
For example, in State v. Flynn, 
Karas successfully defended Flynn, a 
highly respected physician, president 
of the Arizona Medical Association, 
and an Arizona State Senator who 
was instrumental in the passage of 
Arizona's Child Abuse Reporting 
Statute. After the statute was passed, 
Flynn was indicted for allegedly fail-
ing to report a child abuse case. It 
was the one of the first cases in the 
United States in which a physician 
was prosecuted for failure to report 
child abuse. 
Karas has also been active out-
side his practice. He sat on the Amer-
ican Bar Association Criminal Justice 
Section for eight years during which 
he became Vice-Chairman, Chairman-
Elect, and finally, Chairman of the 
Section. Then Dean Kenneth Pye also 
sat on the Section for several of the 
years when Karas was there. Karas 
recalls, "Pye was a real healing pres-
ence between the prosecution and 
defense factions of the Section." 
When Pye left to become Chancellor 
at Duke UniverSity, he was sorely 
missed. 
It was largely Karas's initiative that 
led to the use of video-tapes and the 
institution of a more demonstrative 
educational approach at the ational 
College for Criminal Defense in 
Houston. He chaired two terms of 
the Board of Regents of the College. 
Karas now serves on the Board of 
Governors of the Arizona State Bar. 
Karas remembers Duke for its 
small classes and its rigorous educa-
tional program. He attributes a good 
deal of his success to the training he 
received at Duke. 
Another Duke alumnus who 
looks back at Duke from the perspec-
tive of a number of years of practice 
is Norman Herring. Herring was a 
member of the first graduating class 
of Duke Law SchooL Born in a silver 
mining camp in Nevada, Herring and 
his family moved to Douglas, Ari-
zona, when he was still a small boy 
One of his ancestors was a promi-
nent lawyer in Arizona in the TerritO-
rial Days. When Herring entered 
Duke Law School in 1931 as a trans-
fer student from the UniverSity of Ari-
zona Law School, he had no inten-
tion of practicing anywhere other 
than Arizona. He is, and always had 
been, as he puts it, "a desert man." 
Herring chose to attend Duke 
because, "I wanted a first-rate legal 
education and the broadening expe-
rience of living somewhere other 
than Arizona." According to Herring, 
his class was hand-picked for its high 
degree of scholarship and for its geo-
graphic diversity The student-
professor ratio was nearly one-to-one 
in those days. Justin Miller, then 
Dean of the Law School, held early 
morning classes over coffee at his 
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Herring also remembers his sales 
and contracts professor, Malcolm 
McDermott. Professor McDermott 
apparently wore glasses on a string 
and when making a particularly sali-
ent pOint, would let the glasses fall 
from his nose and fix the class with a 
stony gaze. "'Gentlemen; McDermott 
would say, 'This is the law. '" 
When Herring returned to Ari-
zona in 1933, there were only three 
or four hundred lawyers in the state. 
Herring felt that the intense educa-
tional experience he had had at 
Duke made him one of the best-
trained lawyers in the state. Duke 
had also, Herring says, instilled in 
him a strong sense that "the basic 
responsibility of a lawyer to society is 
greater than the lawyer's need for 
money" 
Herring was admitted to the Ari-
zona bar in 1934 and began his 
career as a general practitioner. He 
worked in Tucson and Douglas for 
some years before settling in Phoe-
nix. In 1949, while still in Tucson, he 
began to specialize in personal injury 
and worker's compensation litiga-
tion. He attended a number of med-
ical seminars for lawyers taught by 
Professor Hubert Winston Smith. 
Gradually, Herring found that he had 
a natural aptitude for medical lore. If 
he carefully studied anatomy and the 
relevant literature, he could become 
an "instant expert" in a particular 
area of medicine. He was one of the 
first members of the National Associ-
ation of Claimants Counsel of 
America, the forerunner of the Amer-
ican Trial Lawyers Association. 
Since 1959, Herring has been 
legally blind. He has no central vision 
and only 2% peripheral vision. 
Nonetheless, Herring still maintains 
a vigorous practice. In 1968, he 
passed the California Bar Exam with 
one of the highest scores. He is one 
of the best-known medical malprac-
tice lawyers in Phoenix. Last year, he 
was the subject of an article on med-
ical malpractice that appeared in the 
Phoenix: Gazette, a local newspaper. 
As he stated in that article, Her-
ring feels he is "'the place of last 
resort for people injured by doctors' 
carelessness .' " However, Herring 
declines to accept about nine of 
evety ten cases that come to him. He 
does careful preliminary research of 
all potential cases and accepts only 
those in which he feels the plaintiffs 
legal expenses will be justified by the 
probable award. Malpractice awards 
and settlements are not only a means 
of earning a living to Herring. They 
also serve to fulfill the ethical duty he 
feels lawyers owe to society by deter-
ring bad doctors and raising the stan-
dard of practice of medicine. 
Duke Law School is still probably 
best-known in the East. However, 
many Duke graduates have chosen to 
pursue their careers in the Western 
states. A number of them are now 
living in Phoenix, Arizona. They haye 
found the city's climate and lifestyle 
ideal and its practice of law both 
broad and challenging. 





Charles H. Livengood,Jr., a 
nationally known labor law expert, 
died at Duke Hospital on October 
10,198'-1, after a long illness. He was 
~3. 
Professor Livengood, a Durham 
native, attended Duke University and 
graduated in 1931. He later entered 
Harvard University and earned his 
la,,' degree in 1934. He was associ-
ated with two New York law firms 
before joining the United States 
Department of Labor as regional 
attorney for Kentucky and Tennessee 
shortly before World War II. During 
the war, he served as a lieutenant 
commander in the Navv He was later 
cited for meritorious service during 
ule Solomon Islands campaign. 
After the war, Professor Liven-
good returned to Durham, where he 
briefly entered private practice before 
joining the Duke Law faculty in 1948. 
During his years at Duke, he served 
as UniverSity Marshall from 1953 to 
1961. He also taught at several other 
univerSities, including the University 
of Sydney, where he was a Fulbright 
lecturer. He was the author of Federal 
WhgeandHour Law, and a contrib-
utor to numerous legal journals. 
Professor Francis Paschal, remem-
bering Professor Livengood's years at 
Duke, noted that Professor liven-
good had the reputation of being the 
finest seminar instructor at the law 
school, and was regarded highly by 
his students. Professor Paschal also 
recalled Professor Livengood's good 
humor and spirit, often masked by a 
certain reserve. Professor John 
Weistart, a student and colleague of 
Professor Livengood, noted his clarity 
and precision in writing. 
Professor Livengood held several 
governmental posts throughout his 
career. He served as a consultant to 
the United States Senate subcom-
mittee on labor relations in 1950. 
Between 1957 and 1960, he was an 
arbitrator with the Federal Mediation 
and Conciliation Service, the Amer-
ican Arbitration Association, and the 
North Carolina Department of Labor. 
He had been a member of the state 
Charles H. Lil'engood, jr: 
General Statutes Commission since 
1966, serving as chairman in 1970, 
and vice-chairman from 1962 to 1970. 
Professor Livengood is survived 
by his wife, Virginia, and a son, 
Charles H. Livengood, III. 
John S. Bradway 
On January 2, 1985, Professor of 
Law Emeritus John S. Bradway died 
after a brief illness in Eureka, Cali-
fornia. Born in 1890 in Swarthmore, 
Pennsylvania, Professor Bradway 
earned his undergraduate degree at 
Haverford College and his U.B. from 
the UniverSity of Pennsylvania. He 
held honorary degrees from Haver-
ford College and California Western 
UniverSity He was a member of Phi 
Beta Kappa and Order of the Coif. 
After service in the Navy during World 
War I, several years in private prac-
tice in Philadelphia, and brief teach-
ing asSignments at the University of 
Pennsylvania and the University of 
Southern California, Professor 
Bradway came to Duke in 1931. 
During his time at Duke, Profes-
sor Bradway focused his research 
activities on the interrelationship of 
law and social work, on clinical legal 
aid instruction, and on domestic 
relations. He is probably best remem-
bered for his emphasis on clinical 
training for law students through 
legal aid programs for the poor. He 
was the Founder and Director of the 
Duke Legal Aid Clinic, and authored 
numerous books on the subject, 
including Clinical Instruction for 
Law Practice, Basic Legal Aid Clinic 
Materials and Exercises, and Law 
and Social Work. Mr. Matthew S. Rae, 
Jr., a graduate of the law school, pupil 
of Professor Bradway, and past 
Supreme Justice of Phi Alpha Delta 
Law Fraternity, said of him: 
Thousands of underprivileged citi-
zens who never heard of him owe 
Professor Bradway their thanks for 
his pioneering work which resulted 
in today's national system of legal 
aid clinics. He indeed left the nation 
richer than he found it. 
From 1922 to 1942, Professor 
Bradway served as Secretary and 
President of the National Association 
of Legal Aid Organizations. In 1948, 
he chaired the Legal Aid Committee 
of the American Bar Association. He 
also served on numerous state com-
missions and boards, including the 
North Carolina Probation Commis-
sion, and the Commission to Study 
Domestic Relations Laws. He was 
president of the Nordl Carolina 
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, Mental Hygiene Society and the State 
Legislative Council from 1947 to 
1949. Professor Bradway retired from 
Duke in 1959. 
After leaving Duke, Professor 
Bradway taught at California Western 
University School of Law in San 
Diego and at Hastings College of Law 
from 1960 to 1965. He later returned 
to California Western, where he 
taught until his final retirement from 
teaching in 1973, at the age of 83. At 
the time of his death, Professor 
Bradway was working on a collection 
of essays dealing with law and legal 
education. John S. Bradway 
For Attorneys, CP&, Trust Officers, CLU's, and Other 
Estate and Financial Planners 
The Duke University School of 
Law and The Duke University Estate 
Planning Council will present the 
Seventh Annual Estate Planning Con-
ference on the campus of Duke Uni-
verSity in Durham, North Carolina, 
October 17-18, 1984. An outstanding 
and nationally known faculty will 
present a program of timely and 
practical interest to all members of 
the estate planning team. 
Subjects on the program will 
include: The Treasury View of Tax 
Agenda 
Reform; Gifts and Sales of Partial 
Interests in Property (Life Estates and 
Remainders); Income Tax Planning; 
The Role of Charitable Giving in 
Estate Planning; The Use ofInsurance 
in Estate Planning; Estate Tax Plan-
ning; Gift Loans-Proper Subject for 
a Gift; The New South Executive; The 
Marital Deduction Revisited; General 
Administration of Estates; IRD-The 
Atomic Bomb in the Estate of a Profes-
sional Partner; The Year in Review-
An Estate Planner's Perspective on Tax 
Developments. 
The conference is designed fOI 
continuing education credit. Partie 
pation is limited to 175. Fee $250 . . 
information write or call: 
Roland R. Wilkins, Director 
7th Annual Duke University Est 
Planning Conference 
PO. Box 3541 
Durham, NC 27710 
Telephone: (919) 684-4429 
Law Alumni Weekend, November 1-2, 1985 
Friday, November 1, 1985 
2:00 p.m. Registration Desk Opens-Lobby, 
Law School 
3:00 p.m. Law Alumni Council Meeting-
Law School 
6:00 p.m. Cocktails, Lobby, Paul M. Gross 
Chemical Laboratory 
7:30 p.m. Dinner on your own 
Saturday, November 2, 1985 
9:00 a.m. Coffee-Danish, Hallway, adjacent to 
Moot Courtroom 
9:15 a.m. Professional Program-Moot Courtroom 
11 :00 a.m. Pig Pickin' BBQ Luncheon, Back Lawn, 
Law School 
(If rain, Portico of Gross Chem.) 
1 :30 p.m. Duke vs. Georgia Tech 
REUNION CLASS PARTIES 
6:30 p.m.* Cocktails, Sheraton University Center 
(each reunion class will have its own paD 
8:00 p.m~ Dinner, Sheraton University Center 
(each reunion class will have its own pM 
*Should dle University decide to reschedule the after-
noon football game to an evening game, the reunion 
parties will be held earlier (Le., 4:00 p.m. for cocktai!l 
and 5:00 p.m. for dinner). 
CHANGE OF ADDRESS 
Name _ _______________________________ Class of ____ _ 
Position,firm ____________________________________ _ 
Office address ____________________________________ _ 
Officephone ____________________________________ _ 
Homeaddress ______________________________ ____ __ _ 
Homephone ____________________________________ _ 
PLACEMENT 
Anticipated opening for third D, second D, and/or first D year law students, or experienced attorney D. 
Date position(s) available _____________________________ ___ _ 
Employer's name and address _ ___ ___ _ ______________________ _ 
Person to contact ___________________________________ _ 
Requirements/comments ________ ____ ____________________ _ 
o I would be willing to serve as a resource or contact person in my area for law school students. 
o I would like to be placed on the mailing list for the Placement Bulletin. 
Submitted by: Class of ____ _ 
ALUMNINEWS 
Name ________________________________ Classof ____ _ 
Address ___ ___________________________________ _ 
~one ________ _________________________ _ _____ _ 
News or comments __________________________________ _ 
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